R. 223.
E6
501.8
L48 07
1907a

To C. van Biema. Esq.

with the author's regards

S. Levy.

22. IV. 07.

JEWISH FREE
READING ROOM
108A WHITECHAPEL RD.
— E. —

R 465

Jewish Free Reading Room
ary.
1.



ORIGINAL VIRTUE

AND OTHER SHORT STUDIES

ORIGINAL VIRTUE

AND OTHER

SHORT STUDIES

BY

THE REV. S. LEVY, M.A.

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
NEW YORK, BOMBAY, AND CALCUTTA
1907


JEWS' COLLEGE
LIBRARY
18711
LONDON

Astor Library, E. L.

To the
Memory of my Parents

PREFACE

THESE Short Studies are not mere reprints of occasional papers which have already appeared in various reviews and periodicals. The Introduction to the "Doctrine of Original Virtue" (pp. 1–14) is entirely new, and the other Essays have undergone careful revision for the present volume.

I am particularly indebted to the Editors of the *Jewish Quarterly Review* and the *Jewish Chronicle* for their courtesy in granting me permission to republish those Studies which were originally contributed to their periodicals.

S. L.

LONDON, *March* 1907.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. The Doctrine of Original Virtue—	
(A.) Introduction	1
(B.) "The Virtues of the Fathers" . .	14
II. Jewish Conceptions of Original Sin . .	43
III. Is there a Jewish Literature? . . .	58
IV. What is "Jewish" Literature? . . .	89
V. Maimonides—Seven Centuries After . .	99
VI. Bishop Barlow on the "Case of the Jews" .	115
VII. John Dury and the English Jewry . . .	125
VIII. The Charm of the Seder (*Passover*) . . .	137
IX. The Seventh New Moon (*New Year*) . . .	145
X. The Feast of Light (*Chanucah*)	157
XI. Purim Pot-pourri (*Purim*)	168

ORIGINAL VIRTUE AND OTHER SHORT STUDIES

THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL VIRTUE

A. INTRODUCTION

It is the aim of this Introduction to give in outline an exposition of the Jewish doctrine of Original Virtue, and to summarise the author's conclusions on the subject, stated in their first form in the essay on "The Virtues of the Fathers" (infra, pp. 14–42).

Original Virtue is a term invented by the present writer, to embrace a related group of definite principles in Jewish thought, which, unified in a general conception, present a complete contrast to the Christian theory of Original Sin.

An analysis of the doctrine of Original Sin discloses the fact that it is a complex idea compounded of three main elements,[1] viz. :—

(*a*) There is in man a natural tendency to sin.

[1] *Cf.* infra, pp. 44, 45.

(*b*) The sins of the fathers are visited upon the children.

(*c*) Adam's act of disobedience, or the Fall of man, is the historic origin of sin, and the cause of punishment for sin.

By analogy, in order to construct our doctrine of Original Virtue, we must point to the presence in Jewish theology of the following three notions:—

(*a*) There is in man a natural tendency to virtue.

(*b*) The virtues of the fathers are rewarded to the children.

(*c*) Some act of obedience, constituting the Ascent of man, is the origin of virtue and the cause of reward for virtue.

When our task is thus prescribed, it proves by no means difficult to establish our parallelism of contraries.

(i.) Judaism insists that man has an impulse to virtue which can overcome his temptation to sin. We therefore find the existence and power of "the good inclination" (*yetser tôb*) asserted, as a corrective to the sway of "the evil inclination" (*yetser hara*).

(ii.) Judaism enters a protest against the theory of the visitation of "the sins of the fathers"

(*Avôn Abôt*) upon the children, and maintains the antagonistic principle, that "the virtues of the fathers" (*Zekut Abôt*) are rewarded to the children.

(iii.) What is the conspicuous act of obedience, which, in Judaism, forms the striking contrast to Adam's act of disobedience, in Christianity? The submission of Isaac in being bound on the altar (*Akedah*) is regarded in Jewish theology as the historic cause of the imputation of virtue to his descendants.

It should be noted, however, that in Christian thought, the Fall of man is attributed to the result of a single act of disobedience on the part of a particular individual, Adam. But in Jewish thought, the Ascent of man is not ascribed solely to one act of obedience on the part of Isaac. The *Akedah* does not stand alone in its presumed beneficent influence on posterity. For "the virtues of the fathers" generally, is interpreted also specifically, as "the merits of the Patriarchs," and the pious deeds of Abraham and Jacob, as well as of Isaac, are supposed to be likewise rewarded, by the loving-kindness of the Lord being extended to their thousandth generation. But this slight variation in detail in the parallelism of opposition does not affect the general validity of the conclusion, that Judaism

possesses, in the three conceptions just unfolded, a complete theory of Original Virtue, modelled on lines analogous to the Christian notion of Original Sin.

This parallelism of opposition between the three constituent elements of Original Sin on the one side, and the three constituent elements of Original Virtue on the other, strikes the present writer as being so obvious, that he has always wondered why scholars should have so uniformly failed to detect it, and should have neglected to give to the Jewish doctrine of Original Virtue due consideration.

For instance, Dr. F. C. Porter is responsible for a luminous essay on "the evil inclination," entitled "The Yeçer Hara, a Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin."[1] But as yet we search in vain for a corresponding monograph on "the good inclination," the *yetser tôb*, a study in the Jewish doctrine of virtue.

Further, "the sins of the fathers" (*Avôn Abôt*) is frequently discussed in commentaries on the Bible, but the paper on *Zekut Abôt*, which follows this Introduction, was the first real attempt to investigate the notion of "the virtues of the fathers." There has since appeared another essay on the same subject, viz. "Zechuth Aboth and the Akedah,"

[1] *Cf.* infra, pp. 45, 46.

by Ephraim Frisch, in the *Hebrew Union College Annual* (1904).

And in the third place, the *Akedah* ("the binding of Isaac") has not received that attention, which its front place in Jewish theology so richly deserves and rightly demands.

It is of supreme importance to lay great stress on the fact, that Original Virtue is not an effete doctrine casually recalled from antiquity. It has always been, and still is, a very living principle, persisting through the ages, clearly and strongly reflected in the Jewish liturgy (itself the growth of many centuries), and exercising a profound influence on Jewish life. The sources of the theory of Original Virtue, as they can be traced in the Bible, Talmud, and Midrash, are briefly but adequately indicated in section B. ("The Virtues of the Fathers"). It will therefore be of greater interest to students if some passages are now quoted from the "Authorised Daily Prayer Book" (ed. Rev. S. Singer), with the object of illustrating the prominence assigned to this doctrine in prayers recited in Jewish homes and synagogues at the present day.

(*a*) *The Good Inclination.*

1. "O lead us not into the power of sin, or of transgression or iniquity, or of temptation, or of scorn: let not the evil inclination have sway over

us:[1] keep us far from a bad man and a bad companion: make us cleave to the good inclination and to good works: subdue our inclination, so that it may submit itself unto thee" (Authorised Daily Prayer Book, 7).

2. "Let our hearts cleave to thy commandments, and unite our hearts to love and fear thy name" (ibid., 40).

3. "Give us understanding, O Lord our God, to know thy ways; circumcise our hearts to fear thee" (ibid., 55).

4. "O Lord, the God of Abraham, of Isaac and of Israel, our fathers, keep this for ever in the imagination[2] of the thoughts of the heart of thy people, and direct their heart unto thee" (ibid., 74).

5. "May he open our heart unto his Law, and place his love and fear within our hearts, that we may do his will and serve him with a perfect heart" (ibid., 74).

6. "Purify our hearts to serve thee in truth" (ibid., 139).

[1] In "The Prayer-Book according to the Ritual of England before 1290," the antagonism between the good and evil inclinations is brought out more forcibly in the following variant reading: "*Let the good inclination have sway over me*, and let not the evil inclination have sway over me." See article by Professor David Kaufmann in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, iv. 35.

[2] Hebrew *yetser*, obviously in this context the *yetser tôb*, "the good inclination."

(*b*) *The Virtues of the Fathers.*

1. "And may it be thy will, O Lord our God and *God of our fathers*" [1] (ibid., 7).

2. "O our Father, our King, for our fathers' sake, who trusted in thee, and whom thou didst teach the statutes of life, be also gracious unto us and teach us" (ibid., 39).

3. "Our God and God of our fathers! may our remembrance rise, come and be accepted before thee, with the remembrance of our fathers" (ibid., 50).

4. "Our Father, our King! have compassion upon us and upon our children and our infants.

"Our Father, our King! do this for the sake of them that were slain for thy holy name.

"Our Father, our King! do it for the sake of them that were slaughtered for thy Unity.

"Our Father, our King! do it for the sake of them that went through fire and water for the sanctification of thy name" (ibid., 57).

5. "Our Lord, our God, hearken to the voice of our supplications, and remember unto us the covenant of our fathers, and save us for thy name's sake" (ibid., 58).

[1] This ever-recurring phrase in the Liturgy is interpreted by commentators as a direct invocation of "the virtues of the fathers." *Cf.* Baer, *Abodath Israel*, 42.

6. "Make thy countenance to shine upon us; remember unto us the covenant of our fathers, and save us for thy name's sake" (ibid., 60).

7. "Our Father, our King, though we be without righteousness and good deeds, remember unto us the covenant of our fathers" (ibid., 62).

8. "The Lord our God be with us, as he was with our fathers: let him not leave us, nor forsake us" (ibid., 215).

9. "And the covenant of the fathers remember unto the children" (ibid., 225).

10. "Return unto us in thy yearning compassion for the fathers' sake who did thy will" (ibid., 237).

(c) *The Virtues of the Patriarchs.*

1. "We are thy people, the children of thy covenant, the children of Abraham, thy friend, to whom thou didst swear on Mount Moriah; the seed of Isaac, his only son, who was bound upon the altar; the congregation of Jacob, thy first-born son, whose name thou didst call Israel and Jeshurun by reason of the love wherewith thou didst love him, and the joy wherewith thou didst rejoice in him" (ibid., 8).

2. "Blessed art thou, O Lord our God and God of our fathers, God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob, the great, mighty, and revered God,

the most high God, who bestowest loving-kindnesses, and possessest all things; who rememberest the pious deeds of the patriarchs, and in love wilt bring a redeemer to their children's children for thy name's sake" (ibid., 44).

3. "Remember thy servants, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; look not unto our stubbornness and our wickedness and our sin" (ibid., 61).

4. "Thou wilt show truth to Jacob and loving-kindness to Abraham, according as thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old" (ibid., 74).

(*d*) *Akedah* ("*the binding of Isaac*").

1. "We are thy people, the children of thy covenant, the children of Abraham, thy friend, to whom thou didst swear on Mount Moriah; the seed of Isaac, his only son, *who was bound upon the altar*" (ibid., 8).

2. "We beseech thee, O gracious and merciful King, remember and give heed to the Covenant between the Pieces [with Abraham], and let the binding [upon the altar] of [Isaac] an only son appear before thee, to the welfare of Israel" (ibid., 60).

3. Gen. xxii. 1–19 (describing the incident of "the binding of Isaac") is one of the readings from the Bible prescribed as an "extra" act

of private devotion after the morning service (ibid., 91, 92).[1]

4. "Remember unto us, O Lord our God, the covenant and the loving-kindness and the oath which thou swarest unto Abraham our father on Mount Moriah: and may the binding with which Abraham our father bound his son Isaac on the altar appear before thee, how he overbore his compassion in order to perform thy will with a perfect heart. So may thy compassion overbear thine anger against us" (ibid., 251).

5. "O remember the binding of Isaac this day in mercy unto his seed" (ibid., 252).

In the light of these illustrative passages, the author claims to have established his contention that Judaism possesses a doctrine of Original Virtue, which still holds a prominent place in Jewish thought.

It now only remains to summarise the ethical import of this conception.

[1] In the ritual of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews, the reading of Gen. xxii. 1–19 is not an "extra," but forms part of the ordinary morning service. See "The Book of Prayer and Order of Service according to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews," edited and revised by the Rev. the Haham, Dr. M. Gaster, pp. 4, 5.

(*a*) *The Good Inclination.*

There is no denial of the freedom of the will, and man's power of choice between good and evil is strongly emphasised. "Say not thou, It is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou shalt not do the things that he hateth. . . . He himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel. If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments. . . . Before man is life and death; and whichsoever he liketh, it shall be given him" (Ecclesiasticus, xv. 11–17).[1]

"By the side of 'the evil inclination,' Judaism as an ethical and psychologic theory from the first placed the *yetser tôb*, 'the good instinct,' the impulse towards the good. . . . The most important factor, however, in the Rabbinical view of man is not that his natural instinct is twofold, and that from the first the evil impulse was held to be accompanied by the good impulse. There is another, a more universal and more comprehensive thought: 'God

[1] *Cf.* C. G. Montefiore, "The Hibbert Lectures" (1892), 518. The following passage is interesting as occurring in a work of fiction: "Mankind is not naturally virtuous, and likewise it must be said that mankind is not naturally vicious. Rather it is neutral, becoming virtuous with the concrete knowledge of and distaste for vice; and vicious, with the concrete knowledge of and distaste for virtue" (E. Temple Thurston, *The Apple of Eden*, ch. xxv.).

created the evil impulse, but he also created the *Torah*, the moral law, as an antidote to it' (*Kiddushin*, 30b; *Baba Bathra*, 16a). It is not a question of man's natural aptitude, not even of his aptitude for good. The law that releases man from the trammels of the natural instinct, the creation of the moral element transcending the whole of nature—this is the momentous consideration."[1]

(*b*) *The Virtues of the Fathers.*

(i.) The element in the doctrine, upon which are based an appeal to God's constancy to his "covenant with the fathers" and the implied conviction of the indestructibility of Israel, has obviously proved a potent factor in inspiring loyalty to Judaism and in contributing to the preservation of the Jewish race. "No weapon that is formed against thee shall prosper; and every tongue that shall rise against thee in judgment thou shalt condemn. This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord, and their righteousness which is of me, saith the Lord" (Isa. liv. 17). "But yet in it shall be a tenth, and it shall return, and shall be eaten up: as a terebinth and as an oak, whose stock remaineth, when they cast their leaves; so the holy seed is the stock thereof" (ibid., vi. 13).

[1] Lazarus, "Ethics of Judaism," ii. 106–108.

(ii.) The divine fulfilment of "the covenant with the fathers," however, is not regarded as a right, but as a token of "loving-kindness." "Know therefore that the Lord thy God, he is God; the faithful God which keepeth covenant and *loving-kindness* with them that love him and keep his commandments to a thousand generations" (Deut. vii. 9).

(iii.) Original virtue is not received as a free gift without the acceptance of reciprocal obligations. There is thus removed any danger of a weakened sense of personal responsibility, in idle reliance on "the virtues of the fathers." Original virtue never countenances a lax conception of moral obligations. Remembrance of "the virtues of the fathers" and the promises given to those who have gone before, constitutes a standard burdening with duty rather than disburdening from it; for it is always assumed as an axiom, that original virtue can only become operative, when the children continue the meritorious deeds of their ancestors.[1]

(*c*) *The Virtues of the Patriarchs.*

The ethical import of this element has already been implied in the previous section on "The Virtues of the Fathers."

[1] Adapted from Lazarus, "Ethics of Judaism," ii. 289.

(*d*) *Akedah* ("*the binding of Isaac*").

In the whole history of Jewish martyrdom, Isaac s regarded as the first and highest example of willingness to be sacrificed for the sanctification of God's name. Stress is always laid "on the typical character of the story as expressing the spirit of martyrdom which permeates Jewish history and has maintained the Jewish faith."[1]

To conclude this Introduction, the doctrine of Original Virtue interprets civilisation in terms of moral order and progress. It asserts that each age is best able to advance nearer the goal of moral perfection, when it starts with the initial advantage of a precious heritage of an accumulated store of ancestral virtues. But in the aristocracy of virtue, the only patent of nobility is the practice of individual virtue, inspired and fostered by the emulation of an idealised past.

B. ZEKUT ABÔT ("THE VIRTUES OF THE FATHERS")

THE object of this essay is to present within the hour's traffic of a lecture an introductory study of the doctrine of *Zekut Abôt* ("The Virtues of the

[1] "Jewish Encyclopædia," *s.v.* "Akedah."

Fathers"). I must reserve for a future occasion the fuller treatment of some points to which only brief allusion can be made in this preliminary investigation.

The subject has not hitherto received special consideration. In "The Old Paths," pp. 137–140, M'Caul devotes a small chapter to "the merit of ancestors." But his treatment is extremely inadequate. In Weber's *Jüdische Theologie,* pp. 292–297, there is a section dealing with "the merit of the fathers," but it is incomplete and unsatisfactory. Scattered throughout many works on theology there are sporadic references to "merit," but they are all characterised by want of sympathy or lack of knowledge.

The late Professor Lazarus, in his "Ethics of Judaism," called attention to the fact that *Zekut Abôt* is a specifically Jewish notion, to which there is no analogy in the thought of other nations.[1] He pointed out the need of a monograph on the subject, and fairly well outlined the scope and method of such a thesis. "It is worthy of a monograph dealing with it philologically, and at the same time presenting its ethical aspects."[2] "The meaning of the term should be defined, its historical development traced, and a critical appreciation of its various ethical aspects thus made

[1] English translation, i. 34, ii. 289. II. 289.

possible. As a matter of course, such an essay should enter into a psychologic consideration of the stimulating and relaxing influence exerted by the idea."[1]

On the whole, I propose in my treatment of the subject to follow the lines of these suggestions.

Zekut is an abstract noun formed from the root *zakah*, "to be pure," and means "purity" or "virtue."[2] The word *zaku*, "purity" (R.V. "innocency"), occurs in Dan. vi. 23. Just as *avôn* means the sin itself, and then also the punishment for sin, so *zekut* means the virtue itself, and then also the reward for virtue, the claim or right to a reward for virtue—hence "merit."[3]

Zekut Abôt is, therefore, generally translated rather literally "the merit of the fathers." But "the merit of the fathers" cannot be regarded as a happy rendering. It gives rise to various misconceptions, and besides, it unfortunately emphasises just those aspects which I do not consider to be fundamental.

In the first place, "the *merit* of the fathers" seems to suggest at once that the theory of *Zekut*

[1] I. 255, 256.

[2] *Cf.* Weber, op. cit., p. 277.

[3] Strack, *Die Sprüche der Väter*, v. 18, seems to me to place the cart before the horse in giving "siegen" as the primary meaning of *zakah*, and "tugendhaft sein" as the secondary meaning.

Abôt is of necessity a *particular* form of the *general* doctrine of merit or justification by works.[1] But in my opinion the two ideas are not so inextricably intertwined. They can, with convenience and advantage, be dealt with separately. *Zekut* is based on the Biblical doctrine of *Tzedek*, "righteousness,"[2] whereas *Zekut Abôt* rests on the Biblical notion of *Chesed*, "loving-kindness." Thus the connection between "merit" and "the merit of the fathers" is accidental, and not essential. We may, if we feel so disposed, dislike the notion of "merit," but we need not in consequence extend our condemnation to "the merit of the fathers." From my point of view, we may quite consistently entertain the most strenuous objections to the naked notion of "merit," and yet warmly embrace the inspiring idea of "the merit of the fathers."

In the second place, "the merit of the *fathers*" is liable to be, and is frequently, interpreted as having special reference to the fathers *par excellence*—i.e. the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. I do not deny that in many passages the phrase must bear this narrower meaning—e.g. in *T. B. Sabbath*, 55a, section beginning, "When did the merit of the patriarchs cease to be efficacious?"[3] Similarly,

[1] *Cf.* Weber, op. cit., p. 292.
[2] Weber, p. 278.
[3] Cf. *Tosafoth*, ad loc., and *Vayikra Rabba*, § 36.

in *Baba Bathra*, 91a, *Zekut Abôt* must be rendered "the meritorious deeds of the patriarchs." But "the merit of the patriarchs" is a gratuitous restriction of meaning to which I strongly demur. I do not wish to exclude the "patriarchs," but the greater includes the less, and I am anxious to restore the wider connotation of the term *Abôt* and to explain it as "the fathers" generally.

We want a new term, then, to free us from previous bias, to help us to approach the subject with greater scientific detachment, and to correct previous ambiguities of interpretation. Our new term must enable us to escape with safety from the temptation of inseparably associating *Zekut Abôt* with the doctrine of "merit." It must make an absolute divorce possible. It must also entirely remove the danger of limiting the meaning of the "fathers" to the "patriarchs." And as I regard *Zekut Abôt* as a parallel doctrine to the theory of original sin, our new translation must also point to this fresh aspect of the subject.

I therefore suggest "original virtue" as our new rendering of *Zekut Abôt*. "Original virtue" fulfils all the three necessary qualifications. Negatively, it asserts that *Zekut Abôt* is not necessarily part of *Zekut*, and that *Abôt* need not necessarily mean "the patriarchs." Positively, it asserts that *Zekut Abôt* is a parallel theory to original sin.

It is important, however, to point out that the doctrine of original sin has been profoundly modified in modern times by the abandonment of the notion of the Fall, and the elimination of the innate depravity of man. According to the latest researches of critics, original sin thus truncated is simply a milder expression for visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children.

"How slender," wrote Jowett, "is the foundation in the New Testament for the doctrine of Adam's sin being imputed to his posterity!—two passages in St. Paul at most, and those of uncertain interpretation. The little cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, has covered the heavens." [1]

It seems curious that while so much attention has been devoted to the consideration of original *sin*, it has never occurred to scholars to stop to inquire whether there may not be a parallel doctrine of original *virtue*. This oversight is all the more striking when we bear in mind the fact that if original sin now means Exod. xx. 5, that God visits the *sins* of the fathers upon the children, we have

[1] "Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans," p. 180. The passage is quoted more fully in F. R. Tennant, "The Origin and Propagation of Sin," p. 226. *Cf.* also Tennant's "Sources of the Doctrine of the Fall and Original Sin"; I. Abrahams's review of this work in *Jewish Quarterly Review*, April 1904, pp. 583–587; and Hastings, "Dictionary of the Bible," *s.v.* "Sin."

but to go to the next verse to find our doctrine of original virtue, that God visits[1] the *virtues* of the fathers upon the children. What more natural and obvious, then, than to pass from the examination of *Avôn Abôt* to *Zekut Abôt*, from "the sins of the fathers" to "the virtues of the fathers," from Original Sin to Original Virtue. Yet, strangely enough, this little leap in thought has never been taken. It is the object of this essay to try to do a little towards rectifying this omission, and to identify the notion of "original virtue" with *Zekut Abôt*.

How shall we define *Zekut Abôt?* I must state at the outset that, as you can readily imagine, I have been unable to discover any formal definition in the whole of Hebrew literature. We have to make many wanderings through the labyrinths of Biblical and Rabbinical writings before we obtain a certain hold upon the clue. There is no definite exposition of what is conveyed by the idea. There is no scientific analysis of the constituent elements of the notion. But if there is no *explicit* statement, there are many *implicit* allusions to the subject. It falls within the province of the trained psychologist to take advantage of such scattered hints and attack the task of working them up into a consistent whole.

[1] Note that "visit" can be used in a good sense, "to reward," as well as "to punish."

I have found sufficient data on the basis of which I am able to construct a satisfactory definition. It must be pointed out, however, that if the definition comes first logically, psychologically it comes last. The logical order and the psychological order are not the same. First principles are in reality last principles, and the best definition is reached at the end of a treatise and not at the beginning.

"The definition of a science has almost invariably not preceded, but followed, the creation of the science itself. Like the wall of a city, it has usually been erected, not to be a receptacle for such edifices as might afterwards spring up, but to circumscribe an aggregation already in existence."[1] My definition, then, is *a posteriori* and not *a priori*. It will therefore cause no surprise if the verses or passages I select as the data on which I build my definition do not necessarily contain the first traces of the doctrine; nor am I bound to place them in chronological order. Had I the time in this paper to deal also with the *history* of the doctrine, I should be able to quote passages containing germs of the doctrine much earlier in date than those I have actually chosen to illustrate my point. As I am making the path, I am entitled to pick my own ground.

[1] J. S. Mill, "Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy" (Essay V.).

The following three passages will serve my purpose to indicate the sources from which I deduce my definition :—

I. Exodus xx. 5.
   (i.) God shows loving-kindness to the thousandth generation
   (ii.) of them that love him and keep his commandments.

II. Psalm ciii. 17, 18.
   (i.) The loving-kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children's children,
   (ii.) to such as keep his covenant, and to those that remember his precepts to do them.

III. The third quotation is a curtailed extract from the first section of the Amidah (Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 44).
   God remembers the pious deeds of the fathers, and
   (i.) in love
   (ii.) shows kindness to their children's children
   (iii.) for his name's sake.

Each of these passages presents some phase or phases of the doctrine, but no single passage is a complete definition in itself. But, taken all together,

I think they fairly exhaust the meaning of original virtue. If we then conjoin these data into a composite idea, we find that the notion possesses the following four constituent elements:—

(*a*) God visits the virtues of the fathers upon the children. I. (i.) II. (i.) III. (ii.)

(*b*) He does so for His name's sake, that is to say, to be true to His promise. III. (iii.)

(*c*) He does so as a mark of grace, as a token of His love, and not as a recognition of man's right. Man cannot claim the exercise of God's mercy. III. (i.)

(*d*) The principle only applies when the children continue the piety of their parents. I. (ii.) II. (ii.)

The first three elements are simple deductions from the data, but I have, of course, to justify the fourth limiting clause, that the principle only applies when the children continue the piety of their parents.

In Psalm ciii. 18, is the phrase "to such as keep his covenant and to those that remember his precepts to do them," in apposition with "them that fear him," or is the antecedent "children's children"?

Baethgen (*Die Psalmen*, p. 305) regards it as a limiting clause, excluding evil-doers from participation in God's loving-kindness.

But this explanation is weak, inasmuch as such a shrinkage of application has already been expressed in verses 11, 13, 17:—

> "For as the heaven is high above the earth, so mighty is his loving-kindness over *them that fear him.*"
>
> "Like as a father hath mercy upon his children, so the Lord hath mercy upon *them that fear him.*"
>
> "But the loving-kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them *that fear him.*"

Baethgen therefore fails to explain what he sets out to explain, namely, the seemingly meaningless parallelism or cumbrous tautology.

I hold with Baethgen that the clause has a limiting effect, but in a different sense to him. My interpretation rests on one of the old exegetical principles of Rabbi Ishmael: "When a general proposition is followed by the enumeration of particulars already comprehended in the general proposition, then the scope of the proposition is limited by the things specified."[1]

[1] Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 13.

Applying this principle to the verses under consideration, my rendering runs thus: "The loving-kindness of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear him, and his righteousness unto children's children, to such [children] as keep his covenant, and to those [children] that remember his precepts to do them." This interpretation need not be rejected as the baseless fabric of my own pretty fancy. It has the support of Ibn Ezra, who, in his commentary on the Second Commandment, Exod. xx. 5, 6, quotes this very verse from Psalm ciii. to back up his explanation. Similarly, the Targum and the Talmud [1] on the Second Commandment enunciate the principle that the sins of the fathers and the virtues of the fathers are visited upon the children only "when the children imitate the deeds of their parents." [2]

It may be urged, however, that when I have resolved the notion into its constituent elements, it is easy to detect flaws in the definition. Different parts of the definition seem to contradict each other. For instance, one part states that God unreservedly visits the virtues of the fathers upon the children, and another part qualifies this by saying, only when the children are themselves virtuous.

[1] *Sanhedrin*, 27b.

[2] Quoted by Rashi to Exod. xx. 5. See Targum to Exod. xx. 5, and xxxiv. 7, and *Nethinah Laggêr* to both passages.

Again, one part declares that *Zekut Abôt* is simply God's fulfilment of a promise, the keeping of a covenant; another part asserts that it is a token of divine love.

These apparent contradictions, far from being sources of weakness, are sources of strength. It is the characteristic of Jewish ethics that it nowhere accepts one theory as final to the exclusion of another. It rejects no great thought, acting on the principle that each may contain some germ of truth.[1] Jewish ethics is essentially a system which is a harmony of contradictories. My definition of *Zekut Abôt* is another illustration of this truth, and is framed in the true spirit of Jewish ethics.

Besides, on closer examination we shall find that there is not so much inconsistency between the different elements of the definition as may appear at first sight. The apparent contradictions will disappear when we remember that we have to differentiate between physical fact, theological doctrine, and ethical teaching. In some respects original virtue is simply the statement of a physical fact. In other respects it is the formulation of a particular theological doctrine. And in other respects, again, it is the enunciation of an ethical teaching. My definition includes all these aspects, as will become

[1] *Cf.* Schechter, "Studies in Judaism," p. 260.

clearer on a little more detailed examination of the implication of each element.

(*a*) *God visits the virtues of the fathers upon the children.*

We have an early instance of this principle in Gen. xxvi. 2–5: "And the Lord appeared unto him [Isaac], and said, . . . I will be with thee and will bless thee, . . . and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; because that Abraham obeyed my voice, and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes and my laws." The reward promised to Isaac is the consequence and result of Abraham's piety.

This element in original virtue is simply a statement of a physical fact, about which there can be no discussion. Just or unjust, it cannot be denied. There it is, and we cannot ignore it. Man does not live by himself alone, and his deeds, good or evil, do not involve himself alone. The deeds of a person do, as a matter of fact, react upon those about him. This makes contemporary virtue collective as well as individual. Man's deeds also react upon his descendants. This makes virtue hereditary, and hereditary virtue is also collective and individual. This is part of what we mean by *Zekut Abôt*. Even those who lead the most

insignificant of lives cannot help influencing those round about them and their descendants who come after them. This influence of one life upon another is not a question of right or wrong. It is a fact, and as a fact it bears with it certain responsibilities.[1] It is an actual fact because of evolution and heredity, environment and education.[2] It is a transference to the moral sphere of a principle already admitted to obtain in the physical domain.[3] It is an expression of natural law in the spiritual world.

(*b*) *For His name's sake.*

This part is the formulation of a theological principle. It is this portion which has, as a rule, loomed largest in the view of those who have studied the question. In the supplementary notes to Weber[4] this element is regarded as the basis of the doctrine. But in my treatment it is reduced to its proper proportions, and placed in its proper perspective.

What part does the idea of the *Berith*, "the

[1] *Cf.* Morris Joseph, "Judaism as Creed and Life," pp. 272–274.

Idem, p. 105.

[3] *Cf.* Karl Pearson, "The Inheritance in Man of Moral and Mental Characters, and its Relation to the Inheritance of Physical Characters" (Huxley Lecture, 1903; *The Times*, Oct. 17, 1903).

[4] Op. cit., p. 409; note to p. 292.

covenant," play in *Zekut Abôt ?* It is an appeal to God's constancy, that He should be true to His promise and faithful to His covenant.

"Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel, thy servants, to whom thou swarest *by thine own self*, and saidst unto them, I will multiply your seed as the stars of heaven, and all this land that I have spoken of will I give unto your seed, and they shall inherit it for ever" (Exod. xxxii. 13). To this the Tanchuma adds, "Thou didst not swear to them by the mountains or hills which may perish, but *by thine own self*."[1]

"Then will I remember my covenant with Jacob, and also my covenant with Isaac, and also my covenant with Abraham will I remember. . . . And yet for all that, when they be in the land of their enemies, I will not reject them, neither will I abhor them, to destroy them utterly, and to break my covenant with them: for I am the Lord their God: but I will for their sakes [*i.e.* in their favour] remember the covenant of their ancestors, whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt in the sight of the nations, that I might be their God: I am the Lord" (Lev. xxvi. 42, 44, 45).

"And it shall come to pass, because ye hearken to these judgments, and keep, and do them, that

[1] Tanchuma, ad loc. This passage is not in Buber's edition.

the Lord thy God shall keep with thee the covenant and the loving-kindness which he sware unto thy fathers" (Deut. vii. 12).

"For the Lord will not forsake his people *for his great name's sake;* because it hath pleased the Lord to make you a people unto himself" (1 Sam. xii. 22).

"But yet in it shall be a tenth, and it shall return, and shall be eaten up: as a terebinth and as an oak, whose stock remaineth, when they cast their leaves; so the holy seed is the stock thereof" (Isa. vi. 13).

"But I had pity for mine holy name. . . . Therefore say unto the house of Israel, thus saith the Lord God, I do not this for your sake, O house of Israel, but for mine holy name, . . . and I will sanctify my great name . . . and the nations shall know that I am the Lord" (Ezek. xxxvi. 21–23).

"O Father, our King! do it for thy sake, if not for ours.

O Father, our King! do it for thy sake, and save us.

O Father, our King! do it for the sake of thy great, mighty, and revered name by which we are called."

(Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 57.)

(*c*) *As a token of His loving-kindness.*

The doctrine of the covenant leads naturally to the element of *Chesed*, "grace."[1] If the descendants are not worthy, and God still keeps His covenant with them, He does so "in love," as a token of His loving-kindness, as a mark of "grace" (*Chesed*).[2]

This element in the definition is therefore partly theological, because it introduces us to the doctrine of grace. But it also points to a physical fact. We see that God shows mercy to people who, as far as human insight can tell, do not apparently deserve it.

We ourselves, in our everyday human conduct, also often act quite apart from any considerations of merit. For instance, we help a man for his father's sake, even if the son is unworthy of our assistance. Because he is the son of his father, we judge him "in the scale of merit."[3] Similarly, we

[1] *Cf.* Hastings, "Dictionary of the Bible," *s.v.* "Grace," and "Encyclopædia Biblica," *s.v.* "Loving-kindness."

[2] I am inclined to think that *Chesed Abôt* is the older expression for *Zekut Abôt*. See Jer. xxxii. 18, and such phrases as "showing loving-kindness to the thousandth generation" (Exod. xx. 6), "Thou wilt show . . . thy loving-kindness to Abraham" (Micah vii. 20), and "who rememberest the loving-kindnesses of the patriarchs" (Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 44).

[3] *Cf.* "Ethics of the Fathers," i. 6 ; Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 185.

give charity to a man not because he deserves it, but because the play of his features reminds us of one near and dear to us. Then we do things for the sake of the past, for "auld lang syne," for the sake of old associations. Witness the blind affection of a mother for her child, or the devotion of a nurse to her charge, even after the child has turned out bad. The love is shown because of the memory of his innocent childhood.

Nations as well as individuals act in this way. The nation continues the payment of pensions to the descendants of those ancestors who in the past rendered yeoman service to the State, even when the descendants have done nothing to deserve such consideration.

All this may be unreasoning; but emotion is not necessarily logical and judicial. That is, as a matter of fact, how we do act. Our deeds are not always dictated by considerations of individual deserts.

Do we not here get a brief and partial glimpse of the solution of the problem which perplexed the Psalmists, "Why God allows the wicked to prosper?" If we mortals, with all our weaknesses, can act thus kindly in the spirit of grace to our erring brethren, would we, to use a bold metaphor, rob God of a privilege and right we do not deny to ourselves?

(*d*) *When the children are themselves virtuous.*

This is a statement of a physical fact. It implies the modern theory of "tendency."

A righteous son of a righteous father requires no explanation. That is what we should expect, and we may regard this case as normal. A wicked son of a wicked father also presents no difficulty. That is also what we might expect, and we may also regard this case as quite normal. This is what the Targum means in its interpretation of the Second Commandment, to which reference has already been made.

The Talmud[1] proceeds to inquire how we can explain the apparent exceptions—the righteous son of a wicked father, and the wicked son of a righteous father. It is because in the one case, says the Talmud, the evil tendency has not been developed, but has been kept in check. Only the good tendency has been cultivated, and hence we get a righteous son of a wicked father. And in the second case we meet with a wicked son of a righteous father, because he has neglected the cultivation of his good impulses, and has developed to the full his evil tendencies.

This, I believe, is quite in accord with the modern theory of evolution and heredity.

Besides, although the law of evolution and progress

[1] *Sanhedrin*, 27b; *Berachot*, 7a; and parallel passages.

may show discontinuity in certain individual cases, yet as a race the world progresses. Herbert Spencer leaves no offspring, but the world benefiting by his teaching is his offspring. In the law of averages errors tend to cancel one another.[1] So in the law of evolution, exceptions tend to counteract one another without the validity of the generalisation being affected.

This element in the definition is also ethical, as it teaches the lesson that we should imitate and continue the tradition of virtue we have inherited.

We are now in a position to proceed critically to estimate the ethical value of the doctrine of original virtue.

We may consider first what, in the language of Lazarus, are the "stimulating" effects of the doctrine.

(*a*) *Emulation of Idealised Past.*—In the first place, it inculcates reverence for and imitation of an idealised past.

"Look unto Abraham your father, and unto Sarah that bare you" (Isa. li. 2).

This thought has been well expressed by Burke in his "Reflections on the Revolution in France" (Clarendon Press Edition, ii. 42):—

"Under a pious predilection for those ancestors,

[1] *Cf.* Jevons, "Theory of Political Economy," p. 16.

your imaginations would have realised in them a standard of virtue and wisdom beyond the vulgar practice of the hour, and you would have risen with the example to whose imitation you aspired. Respecting your forefathers, you would have been taught to respect yourselves."

Dryden has a couplet to the same effect:—

> "Do then as your progenitors have done,
> And by your virtues prove yourself their son."

We only look on the virtues of Israel's heroes in the past. We charitably ignore their failings, because we remember that after all they were human beings. We thus get an idealised past. We hold the mirror up to this idealised past. We catch its reflection, and this idealised past creates within us a sense of something unattained in the sphere of the reality of the present. This idealised past further conveys to our minds and hearts the promise and earnest of a fairer order and more rounded fulfilment in the golden age which we still place in the future. But our visions of this future are based on an idealised past.

(*b*) *Tradition.*—Original virtue teaches respect for tradition, and the necessity of preserving historic continuity. We must not cut ourselves adrift from the past. We must not be traitors to it. Tradition gives us an accumulation of spiritual force. A fixed

liturgy makes us share the feelings of our ancestors, and strengthens us in the faith for which they made sacrifices. Prayers are consecrated by the use of centuries.

The doctrine is an incentive both to the liberal and to the conservative. To the conservative it is an inspiration to maintain tradition. To the liberal it is an incentive to preserve the old stem, even if in his opinion the autumnal leaves have to be cast off.[1]

(*c*) *Organic or Dynamic Solidarity.*—Israel is a body with its limbs stretching through the past, present and future.[2] It is important to note that it is in the discussion on *Zekut Abôt* that the Talmud for the first time lays down the principle, "All Israelites are responsible for one another."[3] This points to the organic nature of human society—that society is extended in time as well as in space.

To quote Burke once more, "Society is indeed a contract. . . . It is a partnership, . . . not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."[4] *Zekut Abôt* thus sounds the note of

[1] *Cf.* Morris Joseph, op. cit., p. 33.

[2] Weber, p. 292.

[3] *Sanhedrin*, 27b; *Shevouth*, 39a; *Mishna Rosh Hashana*, iii.; *Tosafoth Jomtov* on *Zeh Hakelal.*

[4] Op. cit., ii. 113, 114. *Cf.* Kidd, "Principles of Western Civilisation," p. 118.

moral solidarity. But moral solidarity seems to have reference rather to the statics of ethics—the responsibility of the present for the present. But *Zekut Abôt* does more than this. It has reference also to the dynamics of ethics. It also emphasises the responsibility of the present for the future. To the question, "What has posterity done for us?" it answers, "What can we do for posterity?" While original virtue tends to create a sense of corporate liability horizontally, it also has the further effect of uniting in sympathy successive generations perpendicularly. That is why I suggest organic or dynamic solidarity as a better expression to connote what *Zekut Abôt* implies beyond what is already included in moral solidarity.

(*d*) *Virtues to the Virtuous.*—Original virtue must not be regarded as the unearned increment of divine grace. Original virtue is not a legacy bequeathed free of duty. It is not a gratuitous gift of Nature, conferred or received at birth, and enjoyed throughout life without some payment being demanded in return. The acceptance of the boon and the endowment imposes reciprocal obligations. Virtues to the virtuous. "The wages of virtue is virtue."[1]

"All the time the righteous do the will of God

[1] "Ethics of the Fathers," iv. 2; Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 195.

they acquire strength and power to perform further acts of righteousness."[1]

As Carlyle wrote, "Do the duty which lies nearest to thee; the second duty will have already become clearer."

In this sense of original virtue we become, in the language of Goethe, the accomplices of our own destiny (not the despairing fatalism implied in the Scotch expression "to dree one's weird"), the accessories of our own deeds before the fact.

If we would have the privilege of original virtue we must accept the duty of ourselves being virtuous. Original virtue "never countenances a lax conception of moral obligations. Remembrance of the promises given to those who have gone before constitutes a standard burdening with duty rather than disburdening from it, for it is well known that the 'merit' is effectual only 'if the later generation continues the meritorious work'" of its predecessor.[2] Virtues to the virtuous.

Now, what are the "relaxing" effects of the doctrine?

(*a*) There is, of course, the danger of relying on

[1] Yalkut to Lamentations.

[2] Lazarus, ii. 289. On the influence of habit on moral conduct, see the interesting chapter on "Habit" in James, "Principles of Psychology"; Morris Joseph, "Judaism as Creed and Life," p. 272; C. G. Montefiore, "Rabbinic Conceptions of Repentance," *Jewish Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1904, pp. 224, 225.

the achievements of the past, of depending on the virtues of the past, and thus taking away all spurs and incentives to present individual virtue. But we have already seen in the last section how this danger is averted by the principle of "virtues to the virtuous." Our boasting of the past is in vain if we do not continue the work of the past and contribute our own quota to the progressive development of the human race. "Let all who are employed with the congregation act with them for Heaven's sake, for then the merit of their fathers sustains them, and their righteousness endures for ever."[1] Otherwise, as in the Russian proverb, we are simply like geese, cackling because our ancestors saved Rome.

(*b*) It will have been noted that throughout my treatment I have dealt with original virtue quite apart from the doctrine of merit, because, as I said at the beginning, I regard the connection between the two as accidental and not essential. I have no space here to go into the general doctrine of "merit." That is another story for another day.

But, granted that *Zekut Abôt* can, to a certain extent, be also treated as a particular form of merit, what, under those circumstances, is its possible relax-

[1] "Ethics of the Fathers," ii. 2; Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 187. See Lazarus, ii. 287–290, for a discussion of this saying of Rabban Gamaliel.

ing effect? There would be the danger of the sin of self-righteousness, of sanctimonious self-satisfaction, either through the virtue of the present or through original virtue—the virtue inherited from the past.

But this danger is extremely small, and is easily minimised when we remember that Jewish ethics supplies plenty of correctives to the naked notion of merit.

"God did not reveal the respective reward attached to the performance of each precept. Had He done so, some precepts would be scrupulously heeded and others woefully neglected."[1]

"Be heedful of a light precept as of a grave one, for thou knowest not the grant of reward for each precept."[2]

"O Lord, righteousness belongeth unto Thee, but unto us confusion of face" (Dan. ix. 7). R. Nechemyah said: "Even in the hour when we act righteously before Thee, we examine our deeds and are ashamed of our shortcomings."[3]

But the form of our prayers is the best answer. The Jew does not appear as a bold suitor before the throne of God, confident in his righteousness and claiming the reward of his virtue. "Sovereign of

[1] Tanchuma to *Ekev* (Buber's edition).

[2] "Ethics of the Fathers," ii. 1; Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 187.

[3] Tanchuma to *Ki Sisso*. Not in Buber's edition.

all worlds! not because of our righteous acts do we lay our supplications before Thee, but because of Thine abundant mercies. What are we? What is our life? What is our piety? What our righteousness?" [1]

"Our Father, our King! be gracious unto us and answer us, for we have no good works of our own; deal with us in charity and kindness, and save us." [2]

"O Thou who speakest and doest, of Thy grace deal kindly with us." [3]

To sum up, the doctrine of original virtue accepts on the one hand determinism, and on the other hand free-will. It teaches us that man wins reward by his merit, and on the other hand that he only gets kindness shown to him by divine grace.

"Everything is foreseen, yet freedom of choice is given; and the world is judged by grace, yet all is according to the amount of the work." [4]

It is a compromise between individualism and collectivism. It emphasises individual responsibility, and yet recognises that human relations are so mutually involved that there must be cor-

[1] Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 7.

[2] P. 57; again on p. 65.

[3] P. 318. Note in the Hebrew the force of *Chinnom*, "for nothing," i.e. with no claim on our side for the *Chesed* or "grace" we pray for.

[4] "Ethics of the Fathers," iii. 19; Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 194.

porate liability, moral solidarity, and organic or dynamic responsibility. It therefore takes account of evolution and heredity.

Not only is the doctrine itself specifically Jewish, but its manner of summing up within itself mutual contradictions and offering compromises is also specifically Jewish, a characteristic of Jewish ethics. In fact, *Zekut Abôt* touches the whole range of Jewish ethics at so many points, it cuts so deep down to the very roots of Jewish ethics, that it may be said that not only is it a specifically Jewish doctrine, but it may justifiably be regarded as one of the leading principles of Jewish ethics.

I am not bold enough to put forward this paper as the last word on the subject, but I trust that my tentative treatment will form the basis for and provoke a helpful and suggestive discussion, from which may issue the most correct interpretation of what must always be to me the elusive and alluring doctrine of Original Virtue.

JEWISH CONCEPTIONS OF ORIGINAL SIN

It may appear strange to suggest, as is implied by the title of this essay, that there are any Jewish conceptions of Original Sin at all, seeing that it has for so long been assumed and almost regarded as an axiom, that the doctrine finds no place in Jewish theology. The Rev. Morris Joseph ("Judaism as Creed and Life," p. 107) states with pride that Judaism contains no theory of Original Sin, and seemingly condemns its presence in Christianity. "Judaism utterly repudiates such a doctrine as that of Original Sin, which declares that there is something inborn in all men which forces them to do wrong whether they wish it or not." On the other hand, Edersheim ("Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah," 1894, i. 52) boasts of the doctrine as the starting-point of Christian theology, and apparently criticises its absence from Judaism. "What may be called the starting-point of Christian theology, the doctrine of hereditary guilt and sin through the fall of Adam, and of the consequent entire and helpless corruption of our nature, is entirely unknown to Rabbinical Judaism." Thus from different standpoints they both agree, however,

that the notion of Original Sin is entirely unknown in Jewish thought.

It is the object of this paper to endeavour to prove that "it is certainly an exaggeration to assert, as has frequently been represented, that Judaism possessed no doctrine of original sin" (F. R. Tennant, "The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin," p. 232). It will be shown that the Bible and Rabbinical literature contain all the necessary data for a doctrine of Original Sin,[1] but it will further be indicated in what respects the development of these ideas has differed in the Synagogue and in the Church.

This contention will be the more readily appreciated if we proceed at once to analyse the doctrine of Original Sin into its constituent elements. The principal ideas embodied in the theory may be summarised as follows:[2]—

(*a*) There is in human nature an ingrained bias to sin.

(*b*) The sinful tendency of man is transmitted by heredity.

[1] Traces of the notion are preserved in the Liturgy. Ps. lxxix. 8 is still retained in the morning and afternoon services for week-days: "Remember not against us the iniquities of our ancestors" (Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 65).

[2] This summary is deduced from the Thirty-Nine Articles, § 9, and Westminster Confession. *Cf.* F. R. Tennant, "The Origin and Propagation of Sin," p. 7, note, and pp. 151, 152, 159, and the same author's "The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin," pp. 10, 89, 97, 104.

(*c*) Sin is the cause of suffering. Punishment is the consequence of sin. No suffering without sin.

(*d*) The sins of the fathers are visited upon their descendants.

(*e*) Adam's act of disobedience is the origin of sin and the cause of death as the punishment for sin, and the reason for the imputation of sin to posterity (Rom. v. 12–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 22).

The Fall of Adam is thus the real, direct, and immediate cause of (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), and (*d*).

When the implications of the doctrine of Original Sin are thus unfolded, it soon becomes abundantly evident that they suggest almost exact parallels in the Bible or in Rabbinic literature.

(*a*) (i.) On the universality of sin, *cf.* Job iv. 17 (R.V. margin), xiv. 4, xxv. 4; Prov. xx. 9; 1 Kings viii. 46; 2 Chron. vi. 36; Eccles. vii. 20; Ps. xix. 13 (R.V. 12), xc. 9 (R.V. 8), cxxx. 3, cxliii. 2; Jer. xvii. 9.[1]

(ii.) On sin being inherent in man from birth, *cf.* Job xv. 14, 15; Ps. li. 5.[2]

In this connection account must also be taken of the notion of *Yetser Hara*. See "Biblical and Semitic Studies" (Yale University, 1901), pp. 93–156, for an

[1] *Cf.* Tennant, "Sources," p. 101.

[2] *Idem*, pp. 101, 102.

able essay by Dr. F. C. Porter on "The Yeçer Hara, a Study in the Jewish Doctrine of Sin."

(*b*) Isa. xliii. 27, 28.[1] For further passages see § (*d*).

(*c*) This principle is discussed, with references, in the following articles: C. G. Montefiore, "Many Moods in the Hebrew Scriptures" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, ii. 155–160); *idem*, "The Doctrine of Divine Retribution in the Old Testament" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, iii. 1–12); *idem*, "Hebrew and Greek Ideas of Providence and Divine Retribution" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, v. 517–590); *idem*, "The Bible for Home Reading," pt. ii. pp. 118–120, on the problem of the Book of Job; and S. Schechter, "Studies in Judaism," pp. 259–282, on "The Doctrine of Divine Retribution in Rabbinical Literature."

(*d*) Exod. xx. 5, xxxiv. 7; Lev. xxvi. 40; Num. xiv. 18; Deut. v. 9, 10; Hos. i. 4; Isa. vii. 17, xiv. 21; Obad. 10; Jer. xiv. 20, xv. 4, xxii. 28, 30, xxvi. 15, xxxii. 18; Lam. v. 7; Dan. ix. 16; Tobit iii. 3–5; Baruch iii. 5–8. See Tennant, "Sources," p. 100; Cheyne, "The Origin and Religious Contents of the Psalter," pp. 346, 353, note *t*.

(*e*) Death is assigned as the result of Adam's sin

[1] *Cf.* Tennant, "Sources," p. 102, note 2.

in *Genesis Rabba*, xix.;[1] *Baba Bathra*, 17a; *Sabbath*, 55b; *Tanna Debe Elijah Rabba*, v.; Ecclesiasticus xxv. 24;[2] 4 Esdras iii. 7.[3] See also "The Jewish Encyclopædia," *s.v.* "Adam" and "Fall."

The introduction of death and grief into the world is ascribed to Eve (Tal. Jer., *Sabbath*, 5b). *Cf.* Schechter, "Studies in Judaism," p. 289.

In the light of all these passages it can scarcely be rigidly maintained that Jewish theology contains no traces of the doctrine that Adam's act of disobedience was the origin of human sin and the primary cause of death.

It should further be borne in mind that in the Midrash the Revelation at Sinai is regarded as having heralded a new era of innocence and immortality. The sin of the Golden Calf thus attains great importance as the first blot on the second age of sinlessness, and as the fresh cause of death. "When they said: These are thy gods, O Israel, death came upon them" (*Exodus Rabba*, xxxii. § 1; *cf.* § 7). "There is not a misfortune that Israel has suffered which does not contain a small ingredient of retribution for the sin of the Calf" (*T. B. Sanhedrin*, 102a).[4] Jewish theology may thus substitute the

[1] *Cf.* Tennant, "Sources," p. 151.

[2] *Idem*, pp. 119, 121.

[3] *Idem*, p. 224.

[4] Cf. *J. Q. R.*, xvi. p. 585, in the critical notice of Tennant's "Sources" by I. Abrahams.

sin of the Golden Calf for Adam's act of disobedience as the origin of sin and death, but the underlying principle in both cases is the same, viz. the effect and influence of a particular transgression on posterity. It is interesting to find Nachmanides, several centuries later, adopting the same method of exegesis, and imputing the penalty of Abraham's sin to Israel in Egypt. "It is on account of this deed [i.e. of passing off Sarah as his sister] that his children had to suffer exile under the rule of Pharaoh. Where the sin was committed, there also the judgment took place" (see Nachmanides to Gen. xii. 10).[1]

We must now revert to the third element in the theory of original sin, and discuss at greater length § (*c*), "no suffering without sin."

The concomitance of sin and retribution may be illustrated by the following diagram:[2]—



[1] *Cf.* Schechter, "Studies," p. 153.

[2] Suggested by the diagram illustrating the relation between mental experience and brain process, in G. Croom Robertson's "Elements of Psychology," p. 43.

(i.) The earliest notion was that sin [B C] was invariably followed by punishment [b c]. This idea is embodied in the philology of the word *Avôn*, which means both "sin" and the "penalty for sin." Sin and suffering thus became terms simply convertible or correlative. In the first stages of Hebrew thought this parallelism was viewed as complete, and presented no problem to the human mind, for it seemed to breathe a true spirit of divine justice.

But later on it was felt that all the facts were not exhausted in such a proposition. Account had also to be taken of

(ii.) Suffering [a b] not traceable to sin (the absence of sin is indicated by the broken line A B), and

(iii.) Sin [C D] not followed by punishment (the absence of punishment is indicated by the broken line c d).

We thus reach the problem of Job, the Psalmists, and the Prophets, why sometimes the wicked prosper and the righteous suffer.[1] It was because he saw virtue suffering and vice triumphant that Elisha

[1] See A. S. Peake, "The Problem of Suffering in the Old Testament," and the review of this work in the *Hibbert Journal*, April 1905.

ben Abuja became an apostate (*Kiddushin*, 39b; *Chulin*, 142).

Pure and simple faith makes no effort to solve such difficulties. It implicitly relies upon the divine justice, which, it says, cannot be followed by mortal understanding. R. Jannai said: "It is not in our power to explain either the prosperity of the wicked or the afflictions of the righteous." [1] But the human mind, as a rule, is not satisfied with such a tame ending, and refuses to confess itself baffled without a keen struggle. Hence it follows that we can trace attempts to prove that, inasmuch as the sequence B C and b c is certain, we must, according to the principle of continuity, regard the sequences A B and a b, and C D and c d, as inferential, and explain the breakdown in the connection between sin and suffering as appearance and not reality.

The first method adopted to show that the concomitance is complete, equal, and parallel was the introduction of ancestry and the theory of social solidarity. According to this view, in (ii.) A B a b we find the righteous suffering because of the sins of their fathers [*Avôn Abôt*, "the sins of the fathers," is one of the elements in the notion of original sin; see above, § (*d*)], and in (iii.) C D c d the sinners go un-

[1] "Ethics of the Fathers," iv. 19; Authorised Daily Prayer Book, p. 197.

punished because of "the virtues of their fathers" (*Zekut Abôt*).[1] But this solution was not accepted as entirely satisfactory, because it struck a blow at individual responsibility and individual deserts, and still savoured of divine injustice.

With the growth of the notion of a future state, a second solution was suggested. It was recognised that no theory of sin could result in the faultless demonstration of the invariable sequence of sin and suffering. The doctrine of immortality was therefore employed to fill in the gaps necessary to establish a perfect parallelism. This world gives us but an incomplete view. To justify the scheme of the universe, we must assume another state where reward and punishment are commensurate with virtue and sin. In *Tuanith*, 11a, the theory of a future state is used to explain the discrepancies in the following way:—

(α) The retribution of the righteous takes place in this world.

(β) The retribution of the wicked is reserved for the world to come.

(γ) The reward of the wicked is dealt out in this world.

(δ) The reward of the righteous is reserved for the world to come.

[1] See supra, pp. 14–42, for treatment of *Zekut Abôt*.

The same idea occurs in another form in *Baba Kamma*, 50b. "Why is the dual form used in the Hebrew original for the expression 'long-suffering' (Exod. xxxiv. 6)? Because God is long-suffering both towards the righteous and the wicked. He is long-suffering towards the righteous in that He requites them in this world for the few sins which they have committed, so that they may receive their full reward in the world to come. He is long-suffering to the wicked in that He gives them ease in this world, and thus requites them for the few good deeds which they have done, in order to exact the full penalty of their sins in the world to come."[1]

The theory of the "sins of the fathers," § (*d*), must now receive a little fuller treatment.[2]

The first and most natural impulse was to rebel against the injustice of the doctrine that the sins of the guilty should be visited upon their innocent descendants. Hence in the Bible itself we find a tendency to soften the severity of the principle in Exod. xx. 5, 6, by laying greater stress on God's "loving-kindness" and minimising the application of "the sins of the fathers." Thus in Jer. xxxii. 18 we find the order of the two principles reversed, "loving-

[1] *Cf.* C. G. Montefiore, "Rabbinic Conceptions of Repentance," *J. Q. R.*, xvi. pp. 232, 233.

[2] See Dr. M. Friedländer, "The Jewish Religion," pp. 250, 251; S. Schechter, "Studies in Judaism," pp. 265 ff.; and C. G. Montefiore, "Bible," pt. i. 423, 468, 472–474.

kindness" taking precedence over "the iniquity of the fathers"; and in Ps. ciii. 17, "the sins of the fathers" is entirely omitted, and only the passage relating to "the loving-kindness of the Lord" is retained. Further, in other passages there is to be found a growing insistence on individual responsibility—e.g. Exod. xxxii. 33; Deut. vii. 10, xxiv. 16; Amos ix. 8.[1] But even more striking is the formal repudiation of "the sins of the fathers" in Jer. xxxi. 28, 29 [R.V. 29, 30], and Ezek. xviii. 2–4, 20, and the definite assertion of the theory, "The soul that sinneth it shall die: the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son."[2]

In the Talmud and the Midrash the softening process is more gradual and less abrupt than in the Bible. First, the doctrine of "the sins of the fathers" is defended as being in reality an instance of God's loving-kindness. For, whereas the punishment of evil-doers only extends to the third and fourth generation, the mercy shown to the righteous is transmitted to the thousandth generation (see *Mechilta* to Exod. xx. 5, ed. Friedmann, 68b. *Cf.* Nachmanides, ad loc.). Regarded as a token of God's grace, the evil atavism spends itself by the fourth generation, but the good atavism is never exhausted,

[1] *Cf.* Tennant, "Sources," p. 100, note 2.

[2] See C. G. Montefiore, "Hibbert Lectures," 1892, pp. 219, 220.

and asserts itself even in the thousandth generation. The *Mechilta* recognises, however, that a difficulty still remains in the fact that the sins of the guilty *are* nevertheless visited upon innocent descendants, at all events to the third and the fourth generation. Hence the further mitigation in the *Mechilta*, that the sins of the fathers are only visited upon the children when three successive generations are given over to sin without a virtuous generation intervening to break the continuity of guilt. Then, in *Sanhedrin*, 27b, we get the idea more clearly enunciated that "the sins of the fathers" is not a *doom*, but merely a tendency, which can be yielded to or checked,[1] and that the sins of the fathers and the virtues of the fathers are only visited upon the children "when the children continue the deeds of their parents." "Evil and good come not out of the mouth of the Most High (Lam. iii. 38), but they are self-determined. Evil cometh upon evil-doers, and good cometh upon them that do good" (*Deut. Rabba*, iv. § 3 to *Reëh*). And finally, in *Makkoth*, 24a, as in Jeremiah and Ezekiel, we reach the explicit abandonment of "the sins of the fathers" and the formulation of individual responsibility. "Moses founded four institutions, and four prophets arose and annulled them. . . . Moses said, God visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children (Exod. xxxiv. 7). Ezekiel came

[1] *Cf.* Morris Joseph, op. cit., p. 107.

and annulled it by saying, The soul that sinneth it shall die (Ezek. xviii. 4)." In a variant version in *Bamidbar Rabba*, xix. § 33, this alteration is made by God at the instigation of Moses.

This rough outline of the sources of Jewish conceptions of Original Sin has already betrayed, *en passant*, some hints of the difference of the development of the doctrine in Judaism and Christianity.

In the first place, we have just seen that Jewish theology does not deny, but very firmly maintains, the principle of individual responsibility and the freedom of the will. "Talmudic literature insists on a man's capacity to control his evil inclination, mighty as it is. There is no hint that his free-will is diminished in consequence of the sin of his first parents; and herein lies the main difference between the spirit of the teaching of the Synagogue and that of the Church. The Rabbis recognised, of course, the general sinfulness of humanity, but yet maintained the theoretical possibility of sinlessness, and indeed held that in some cases this had actually been attained" (Tennant, "Sources," p. 175; *cf.* also p. 176). In this respect the Jewish notion of Original Sin was arrested in its progress, and escaped taking the extreme form of determinism it adopted in Christian thought. Like an unfinished railway track, it was brought to an abrupt and untimely end

in a siding on the brink of a precipice which led to loss of self-control and would end in moral disaster.

In the second place, Jewish notions of Original Sin were always tempered by the saving doctrine of repentance (see "The Jewish Encyclopædia," *s.v.* "Adam"). "If a man comes and says, God does not receive the penitent, then Manasseh the son of Hezekiah will come and testify that no creature in the world sinned against Me as he did, and yet in the hour of his repentance I received him" (*Bamidbar Rabba*, xiv. § 1).

The consideration of the question whether the Church took over the Jewish conceptions of Original Sin and developed them on independent lines, and then Judaism consciously protested against the Christian teaching by emphasising the principles of free-will and repentance, or whether, as suggested by Tennant ("Sources," p. 343), the doctrine of the Fall, as a whole, had to be deduced afresh in the Church, is beyond the scope of this essay.

Suffice it here to have established that in the earliest Christian centuries Judaism possessed certain definite theories of Original Sin, and to have briefly indicated the different evolution the doctrine underwent in the Synagogue and in the Church.

Just as the Jewish doctrine of Original Virtue was happily saved from becoming unduly elating and relaxing by the concomitant insistence on individual

righteousness,[1] so the Jewish doctrine of Original Sin was preserved from becoming unnecessarily depressing and fatalistic by the accompanying assertion of the freedom of the will and the power of repentance. "There is nothing greater than repentance; repentance is second to the Law."[2]

[1] *Cf.* "The Doctrine of Original Virtue," supra, pp. 37, 38.

[2] *Debarim Rabba,* ii. § 24, beginning; *Bamidbar Rabba,* ii. § 10. See C. G. Montefiore, "Rabbinic Conceptions of Repentance," loc. cit., p. 257.

IS THERE A JEWISH LITERATURE?

Is there a Jewish literature? I should be indeed bold to appear before a Jewish literary society and venture to answer such a question in the negative. But I found it no easy matter to indicate in a brief headline the aim and scope of my lecture. Perhaps I should go further, and frankly acknowledge that had I succeeded in hitting upon a title which would in succinct form have given away my argument, my task would have been ended. It is necessary, then, that I should state at somewhat greater length the real problem I am raising and trying to solve. Our question may be conveniently expressed as follows: Granted that the Jews possess a literature which is peculiarly their own, is that literature best or correctly described by the term "Jewish" literature? It is when the problem is put in this form that without any hesitation my reply must be given in the negative.

Obviously the theme resolves itself into an exercise in definition. Definitions may be odious, but they are necessary evils and useful instruments in the progress of science. I well remember how the late Professor Croom Robertson used to shed a piercing

light on momentous disputes in psychology and philosophy by a rigorous analysis of the meaning of the terms employed by the different schools of thought. The "Dialogues" of Plato are practically searches after definitions, and we have the high authority of the late Professor Sidgwick for believing that the discussion itself may prove of greater value than the particular definition finally selected.[1]

Let us then to-night turn logicians, and ask ourselves what we mean by the terms "literature" and "Jewish." As logicians we must begin with "literature," the class name, before we deal with "Jewish," the specific attribute.

I presume that originally "literature" denoted a body of writings composed by individuals who were of a common race, formed a common nation, and wrote and spoke a common language. Thus Greek literature consisted, in the first instance, of the best productions in prose and poetry of born Greeks, who were constituents of the same Greek confederacy and who used the Greek language as their medium of intercourse.

Let us now take an illustration nearer home. English literature, on the same analogy, represents the highest expression of the great thoughts of born Englishmen, members of the English nation

[1] Sidgwick, "Principles of Political Economy," p. 59. *Cf.* Keynes, "Scope and Method of Political Economy," p. 152.

and writing in the English language. In the words of Stopford Brooke, "The history of English Literature is the story of what great English men and women thought and felt, and then wrote down in good prose and beautiful poetry in the English language." [1]

Here we see at once ambiguities created by lapse of time and change of circumstances. In the first place, we have to extend the meaning of the term "English" to include Scotchmen, Welshmen, and Irishmen, who possess this attribute in common of using the English tongue. Nevertheless we still hear of the sensitiveness and wrath of the Scotch at Carlyle being included in a series of biographies called "*English* Men of Letters." In the second place, so many new and varied elements have in the march of events been introduced into and absorbed by the English nation, that in our definition of English literature we find ourselves ultimately compelled to eliminate the criterion of birth and race. And this in spite of Stopford Brooke, who in the definition quoted above and in the following passage retains the race qualification. "It is this sameness of language, *as well as the sameness of national spirit*, which makes our literature one literature for 1200 years." [2]

[1] Stopford Brooke, "Primer of English Literature," p. 5.
[2] Ibid., pp. 6, 7.

But what is an Englishman? It may not be amiss to quote in this connection a few lines from Daniel Defoe's satire on "The True-born Englishman."

> "Thus from a mixture of all kinds, began
> That het'rogeneous thing, an Englishman.
> . . . . . .
> A true-born Englishman's a contradiction;
> In speech an irony, in fact a fiction;
> A banter, made to be a test of fools,
> Which those that use it justly ridicules;
> A metaphor, invented to express
> A man akin to all the universe."

And now the difficulties begin to crowd upon us thick and fast. If Englishmen live in foreign lands and write books in English, must their works be excluded from English literature because they were not written within a specified area of soil? Must we shut out brilliant despatches from our ambassadors at foreign courts? Must we ignore certain literary productions of men like Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, or the late Lord Dufferin, on the sole ground that they were not composed in this little island? Or take the case of the late P. G. Hamerton, the art critic, who wrote French and English with equal facility and felicity. Is English literature entitled to annex his French as well as his English works, on the plea that the author was an Englishman; or should French literature be permitted to claim

them, because the language used was French? How shall we deal with foreigners like Max Müller, who happen to be responsible for better English than is written by many native Englishmen? Then the growth of the Empire suggests still further points of inquiry. What place, if any, shall be assigned in the ranks of English literature to colonials like Sir Gilbert Parker, who write excellent English but have not been born in England?

It may be urged that I am providing you with an unnecessarily lavish display of illustration, but I believe this to be the best method of showing the many-sidedness of the problem. The difficulties I have indicated lead inevitably to the conclusion that the definition of literature has to be narrowed in one direction and enlarged in another—narrowed in one sense by abandoning the criteria of birth, race, and nation, and widened in another sense by regarding language as the sole test in marking the boundaries of a literature We have thus what logicians call a decrease in connotation or intension, but an increase in denotation or extension, because the number of persons possessing the attribute of using a given language is larger than the number of persons possessing the additional qualification of being born members of the nation using that language. A literature, then, comprises the corporate mass of

compositions in any given language, irrespective of the birth, race, or nation of the authors.

How does all this bear upon the problem with which we started, Is there a *Jewish* literature? Holding as I do most strongly that the language in which the works are written is the sole and all-important criterion in any definition of literature, I am constrained to challenge the statement made by Karpeles at the very beginning of his work entitled *Geschichte der jüdischen Literatur*. "The history of Jewish literature," he says, "embraces the collective writings of Jews from the dawn of history until the present age, without any reference to the form, *language*, or contents of those writings."[1] I am prepared to agree with Karpeles in laying no stress on form and contents, but I am diametrically opposed to him when he ignores the Hebrew language as the essential feature in any definition of Jewish literature. I go further and maintain that the epithet applied to the literature must invariably be identical with the epithet applied to the language. No language, no literature. No *Jewish* language, no *Jewish* literature. There is a *Hebrew* language, so we must speak of *Hebrew* literature. The two views may be contrasted thus. Karpeles would include in Jewish literature whatever is written by Jews, be the language what it may, "Hebrew, Aramaic, Greek,

[1] Op. cit., p. 1.

Arabic, Spanish, Italian, French, German, and many other languages."[1] I would include in Hebrew literature only such works as are written in Hebrew, be the author Jew or Gentile. In other words, the definition given by Karpeles is built on a *racial* foundation; my definition rests on a *linguistic* basis.

Of course, if we could legitimately speak of a *Jewish* language, we should have a perfect right to speak of a *Jewish* literature. But I contend we are not justified in assuming that the term "Jewish" has ever been or can ever be used as a synonym for "Hebrew" as applicable to language. As far as my memory serves me, there is only one instance in the whole of Hebrew literature where there is even a near approach to a trace of such a usage. The passage I have in mind is 2 Kings xviii. 26, 28: "Then said Eliakim the son of Hilkiah, and Shebnah, and Joah, unto Rabshakeh, Speak to thy servants in the Syrian language; for we understand it: and speak not with us in the *Jews' language*, in the ears of the people that are on the wall. . . . Then Rabshakeh stood, and cried with a loud voice in the *Jews' language*, and spake, saying, Hear ye the word of the great king, the king of Assyria." But even this apparent exception is open to a simple explanation. The word *Jehudith* ("Jewish") does not mean

[1] Op. cit., p. 2.

the *Jewish* language, but the *Hebrew* language spoken by Judæans, i.e. inhabitants of the kingdom of Judah. There is no implication that the language spoken in the kingdom of Israel was different from that current in the kingdom of Judah, but the universe of discourse is limited, and includes only the Hebrew language of the kingdom of Judah and the Assyrian language of the enemy then at the gate. As far as I can recall my reading, this is the only example in the whole of Hebrew literature where the Hebrew language is called anything but *Ivrith* ("Hebrew"), an expression which is absolutely unambiguous.[1]

Not only are we thus precluded from using "Jewish" and "Hebrew" as convertible epithets, but we are entitled to go much further and stoutly maintain that the term "Jewish" never has had applicability to language, but has always borne a *racial* signification. The name "Jew" dates from the division of the kingdom, and originally denoted a Judæan, a member of the kingdom of Judah, in contrast to an Israelite, a constituent of the kingdom of Israel. After the Exile, the Ten Tribes lost their identity, and the term "Jew" became the indiscriminate appellative of every born Hebrew.

[1] Professor W. Bacher has called my attention to another instance of the use of *Jehudith* ("Jews' language") in Neh. xiii. 24.

On the other hand, "Hebrew" has always had a much wider connotation, with a distinct reference to language as well as race.

The history of Hebrew literature would thus be the story of what born Hebrews living in Palestine thought and felt, and then wrote down in good prose and beautiful poetry in the Hebrew language. But we feel at once the narrowness of this provisional definition and are unable to accept it as final. Problems arise similar to those which confronted us in our examination and criticism of Stopford Brooke's definition of English literature. Are Hebrew writings composed by Hebrews outside Palestine to be included in Hebrew literature? This question is not so absurd as may appear at first sight. We may recall the interesting commentary of the *Mechilta* on the first few verses of the Book of Jonah. "Now the word of the Lord came unto Jonah . . . saying, Arise, go to Nineveh, that great city, and cry against it; . . . but Jonah rose up to flee unto Tarshish from the presence of the Lord."[1] "How could Jonah imagine," asks the *Mechilta*, "that he could flee from the presence of the Lord? Is it not written, 'Whither shall I go from thy spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there; if I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the utter-

[1] Jonah i. 1–3.

most parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me.'[1] But Jonah believed that the spirit of divine prophecy would not rest upon him *outside the borders of Palestine*, therefore he rose up to flee unto Tarshish from the presence of the Lord."[2] We should also remember the reason given in the Talmud for not saying Hallel on Purim. "Hallel is not recited in gratitude for God's mercy shown to Israel *outside the land of Palestine*."[3]

It is conceivable, then, that Hebrew literature might have to be bounded by national and territorial limits, that Jonah's notion of divine inspiration might have to be extended to the language in which the prophetic utterances were made, and that we might have to exclude from Hebrew literature compositions in Hebrew which were not racy of the soil of Palestine. But happily a more universalistic doctrine has prevailed. "In every place where I cause my name to be remembered I will come unto thee, and I will bless thee."[4] Every work written in Palestine or outside Palestine, provided it be written in the *Hebrew* language, is blessed by its inclusion in Hebrew literature. Thus the prophets of the Exile are to be found in the Hebrew canon of the Bible, and the Talmud of Babylon and all other

[1] Ps. cxxxix. 6–9.
[2] *Mechilta*, ed. Friedmann, 1b.
[3] *T. B. Megillah*, 14a.
[4] Exod. xx. 24.

Hebrew works of all lands and of all ages find their place in Hebrew literature.

As a result of these developments, our provisional definition of Hebrew literature must be subjected to the following important modifications. It is not an essential condition that a Hebrew work, to be included in Hebrew literature, must have been written in Palestine.

Furthermore, a Hebrew work, to be included in Hebrew literature, need not have been written by a born Hebrew. It is a mere accident that in the past the racial element has persisted in the fact that Hebrews alone have written and write Hebrew. In the event of Gentiles using Hebrew as their medium in expressing their thoughts, we should have to find room for their works in Hebrew literature. To my mind this is not a startling suggestion, nor would it be a remarkable innovation. It would simply be the logical outcome of a traditional habit continued through centuries. We bind the Targum of Onkelos the Proselyte with our copies of the Pentateuch. It would be but a small step forward to include in Hebrew literature the Hebrew works of Gentiles who do not go the length of becoming proselytes.

I therefore claim that, as against Karpeles, I have established my two propositions: first, that the expression "Jewish" literature is incorrect, and that we must substitute for it "Hebrew" literature;

and secondly, that Hebrew literature comprises the corporate mass of works written in *Hebrew*, be the authors Jews or Gentiles. In other words, the *linguistic* test is more logical and scientific than the *racial* criterion. *The Hebrew language is the basis of Hebrew literature.*

Now, what do we mean by the Hebrew language? Just as by English we understand the old well of English pure and undefiled, into which from time to time there have been mingled supplies from many and varied streams, so by Hebrew we mean the language of the Bible, with the addition of those terms and phrases which Hebrew has in the course of ages absorbed and assimilated. The earliest form of the Hebrew language is very different from modern Hebrew in form, pronunciation, and appearance; but nevertheless the language written by the prophets and psalmists is the same language as that in which modern Hebrew works are written, just as much as the tree planted a hundred years ago is the same tree to-day.[1]

After having criticised Karpeles' definition of Jewish literature, I am all the more glad to have the opportunity of quoting the authority of his name in support of my definition of the Hebrew language. "The designation 'neo-Hebraic' literature," he says, "is wrong, and owes its origin to the prejudice

[1] Adapted from Stopford Brooke, op. cit., p. 6.

which thinks a division must be made between the *old* Hebrew and *later* Hebrew literature."[1] In the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, October 1902, Professor J. D. Wijnkoop has given more emphatic expression to the same view. "Hebrew," he writes, "could not elude that general law, that every civilised language in the course of centuries undergoes great alterations. In addition to new subjects, different modes of reasoning, and foreign conceptions, brought about by greater communication and more extensive intercourse, it seems that a considerable part of these changes must be attributed to an ever-increasing tendency and desire on the part of those who use the language, to express their thoughts with greater precision and lucidity. With this end in view, they create for themselves new forms of speech, extend the stock of words, and seek new constructions. . . . Later Hebrew, far from being a language having no connection with the older tongue, ought, on the contrary, to be considered only as a direct continuation of it, indeed as *a language which is constructed upon the foundations of classical Hebrew*."[2]

I said before that the Hebrew language is the basis of Hebrew literature, and that we should therefore speak of *Hebrew* literature, and not *Jewish* literature. Well, what is the practical value of this

[1] Karpeles, op. cit., p. 2. [2] *J. Q. R.*, xv. 37, 38, 49.

correction? What advantage does this conclusion yield? *Cui bono?* If we use the term "Hebrew" literature instead of "Jewish" literature, I think we are provided with an instrument for overcoming the most intricate difficulties of classification. To which literature shall we assign works written by Jews in languages other than Hebrew? For instance, where shall we place Zangwill's "Dreamers of the Ghetto"? Karpeles would include it in *Jewish* literature, because written by a Jew, and English people would claim it as a contribution to *English* literature, because written in English. Now, it is inconvenient as well as unscientific to have such overlapping in definition. How can we get rid of this anomaly? By rigorously insisting upon the adoption of the expression "Hebrew" literature. Zangwill's "Dreamers of the Ghetto" is written in English, therefore it is English literature. It is *not* written in Hebrew, therefore it is *not* Hebrew literature. Mr. Israel Abrahams' "Jewish Life in the Middle Ages" is written in English, therefore it is a contribution to English literature. On the other hand, Mr. David Yellin's Hebrew translation of this work is a contribution to Hebrew literature. The German edition of Graetz is a contribution to German literature; the English translation is a contribution to English literature, and the Hebrew translation by Harkavy and Rabbinowicz is a contribution to Hebrew literature.

In addition to works written by Jews in languages other than Hebrew, but which are not Hebrew literature because not written in Hebrew, there are many works written by non-Jews in languages other than Hebrew, but which are nevertheless of vital and perennial interest to Jews. How shall we deal with them? How, for example, shall we classify the contributions made by Cheyne and Driver to our knowledge of the Bible? Here again my test holds good. The works of Cheyne and Driver are not Hebrew literature, because not written in Hebrew. They are English literature, because written in English.

I hope no one thinks I am arguing against a cosmopolitan taste in literature, and recommending that, even if we could, we should restrict our reading to works written in the Hebrew language. There are, of course, many contributions made both by Jews and non-Jews to the literatures of the world, which are not Hebrew literature because not written in Hebrew, but which we may nevertheless study with advantage, either as Jews or as children of the world. But I am now pursuing quite a different line of thought. I am engaged in the task of definition and classification, and endeavouring to introduce precision into the employment of terms, and I maintain that the use of the Hebrew language is the sole criterion of what should or should not be regarded as Hebrew literature. History proves my

contention. That which has persisted in Hebrew literature has always been that which has been composed in the Hebrew language or translated into the Hebrew language. Jews have always been wanderers over the face of the globe, and when circumstances made them cease to have a living interest in Greek, they dropped the study of the Jewish-Hellenistic literature. When Jews no longer needed Arabic in their intercourse with their neighbours, they ignored the Arabic literature of the Jews. All that Jews ultimately remember and love is that which was originally written in Hebrew or preserved in Hebrew translations. I doubt very much whether Jehudah Halevi's "Cuzri," Bachja's "Duties of the Heart," and Maimonides' "Guide of the Perplexed" would have so many Jewish readers in modern times, had those works not been accessible in Hebrew translations, instead of the Arabic in which they were originally composed.

The deeper we go into the problem, the more convinced we shall become of the inaccuracy of the expression "Jewish" literature, and the correctness and consistency of the term "Hebrew" literature.

But our study would be incomplete did we not take into consideration another aspect of the problem, and inquire whether, after all, we cannot retain the expression "Jewish literature" and understand by it the literature *about* Jews and Judaism, in what-

ever language and by whomsoever that literature may have been written.

At first sight this interpretation would appear to be thoroughly defensible, but I think that even this definition will on closer inspection be found to break down completely.

In the first place, if, as we are logically bound to do, we consistently adhere in the discussion to the *generic* meaning of the word "literature," we shall fail to find a strict analogy to justify us in explaining "Jewish literature" as the literature *about* Jews and Judaism. By Greek literature we understand literature written *in* Greek, and not literature written *about* the Greeks. By English literature we do not mean literature written *about* the English, but literature written *in* English, which may or may not have been written *by* Englishmen and which may or may not have been written *about* the English people. H. A. Taine's *Histoire de la Littérature anglaise* is without doubt a contribution to *French* literature, but according to the suggested interpretation of Jewish literature it should be regarded as *English* literature, because it has reference to English literature. On the other hand, I should classify H. van Laun's English translation of this work, bearing the title "History of English Literature," as English literature, because written *in* English. In English literature we do not include works *on* English literature

which are composed in languages other than English. Otherwise English literature would have to annex German tomes on Shakespeare, although written in German. But the English translation of Ten Brink's treatise on "Early English Literature" belongs to English literature, because in English. Saintsbury's English work on "French Literature" is English literature, because written *in* English, and not French literature although written *about* the French. Grote's "History of Greece" is English literature, because written *in* English, and not Greek literature because written *about* the Greeks. Similarly, Motley's "Rise of the Dutch Republic," Bolton King's "History of Italian Unity," and Bodley's "France" are all contributions to English literature, and do not belong to Dutch, Italian, or French literatures respectively.

No definition of literature which does not rest on the linguistic test can give a satisfactory solution to the following intricate case. A few years ago Steinschneider contributed a series of articles in English to the *Jewish Quarterly Review* on "The Arabic Literature of the Jews." A German continuation of these essays has lately appeared under the title of *Die arabische Literatur der Juden.* Is the English work German literature because written *by* a German? Is the German work German literature because written *in* German? Are both works Arabic literature because written *about* Arabic literature? Are

both works Jewish literature because written *about* Jews? I contend that the English work is a contribution to English literature, the German treatise is a contribution to German literature, and that neither belongs to Arabic or Jewish literature, although written *about* the Arabic literature of the Jews.

In the second place, we can object to the definition of Jewish literature as literature about Jews and Judaism, because, if adopted and rigorously applied, it would lead to the exclusion of certain forms of literature which Karpeles must maintain to be Jewish literature because written by Jews, and which from my point of view I should have to include in Hebrew literature because written in Hebrew. There are many works written in pure Hebrew and by Jews which are certainly not literature *about* Jews or Judaism, but which, according to this meaning of Jewish literature, must not be regarded as Jewish literature. There are, for instance, treatises in Hebrew on medicine and other branches of science, secular poems and dramatic compositions, which have not the remotest relation to Jews or Judaism, and which should accordingly be shut out from Jewish literature. But I urge that a Hebrew poem on the game of chess[1] is Hebrew literature, because written in Hebrew. Karpeles would include it in Jewish literature, because written by a Jew.

[1] *Cf.* Nina Davis, "Songs of Exile," pp. 127–131, 141, 142.

But if the expression "Jewish literature" is defended and retained in the sense of literature *about* Jews or Judaism, we should find ourselves in the strange position of having to exclude such a composition from Jewish literature, on the ground that its subject is not Jews or Judaism, although it is written in Hebrew and by a Jew. What an absurd conclusion!

There is another shade of meaning attached to "Jewish literature" to which similar objections apply. I refer to the interpretation of Jewish literature as literature inspired by Jews or Judaism. This argument can be more conveniently discussed under two headings—(*a*) translations direct from the Hebrew, and (*b*) adaptations from the Hebrew and developments of Jewish ideas.

As regards (*a*), translations direct from the Hebrew, if we accept the proposed interpretation of Jewish literature, we should have to assign to Jewish litera ture all the versions of the Bible in the world, because they have been inspired by the Hebrew Bible. The Authorised and Revised Versions of the Bible in English, and Milton's translations of the Psalms, would thus belong to Jewish literature.

Let us take another definite example. Some years ago the late Professor Kaufmann contributed to the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* an article entitled "*Der Führer* Maimuni's in der Weltlitteratur," in which he gave a masterly treatment of all the

editions and translations of the *Moreh Nebuchim*, and traced the influence of this work on subsequent philosophic thought. Are the translations referred to Jewish literature because inspired by Jewish thought, or should they be ascribed to the literatures of their respective languages?

Let us now examine a few cases where we can have no bias to affect our judgment in answering the question. Is Pope's "Iliad" a contribution to English literature because written in English, or Greek literature because based on the Greek? Bentley, the great classical scholar, implied what his decision would have been, when he said that Pope's "Iliad" was good Pope but indifferent Homer. Does Jowett's "Dialogues of Plato" belong to English literature because in English, or to Greek literature because translated from the Greek? To my mind, it appears much more reasonable in all these cases, to return the translations to the literatures of the respective languages in which they have been written.

(*b*) If by Jewish literature we understand the literature of Judaism, i.e. the literature inspired by Jews and Judaism, we should have to incorporate in Jewish literature every commentary on the Bible in the world, of every language and of every age, from the early Church fathers, through the mediæval monks, to modern exegetes like Delitzsch, Cheyne, and Driver. It would be a curious anomaly to describe

Christological interpretations of the Bible as Jewish literature, a conclusion we cannot resist if Jewish literature means literature based on Hebrew thought. If we accept this definition, we should also have to include in Jewish literature works like Herder's *Geist der hebräischen Poesie*, Renan's "Life of Jesus," and Huxley's "Science and Hebrew Tradition," because they are all dependent on Jewish ideas. To take Jewish literature in this vague and wide sense would make it impossibly vast, almost coterminous with the literatures of the world, and we should find Jewish literature collapsing by reason of its own weight.

What lies at the root of all the misconceptions in the attempts to arrive at a satisfactory definition of Jewish literature, which I have endeavoured to brush aside, is, I believe, the confusion in thought arising from the fact that disputants do not consistently adhere in the discussion to one precise meaning of the word "literature." To describe a literature by its subject, contents, or source of inspiration, is to adopt a *specific* meaning of "literature," and not the *generic* connotation clearly implied, when we speak of the literatures of the world, based on the languages in which those literatures have been written. Errors creep in when, against all the rules laid down by logic, the *generic* meaning of literature is not maintained throughout the argument, and is not carefully distinguished from the *specific* meaning of literature,

and thus the first Law of Thought, the Law of Identity, is subtly violated. Literature has without question a *specific* nuance of meaning which would justify the expression "Jewish literature" in the sense of literature about the Jews or inspired by Judaism, in the same way that psychological literature means the literature on psychology in every language. But there is an important difference between bibliography and literature. In the specific sense of literature, Jewish literature may mean literature written in Hebrew, the language of the Jews; literature written by Jews in any language; and literature inspired by Jews or Judaism and written in any language by anybody. But in one and the same discussion to confuse these various possible explanations of Jewish literature, and without a word of warning or qualification to interpret them all as absolutely equivalent or synonymous, is to break all the principles of logical definition and division. It is as though we classified the literatures of the world into Greek (i.e. written *in* Greek), Latin (written *in* Latin), French (written *in* French), German (written *in* German), English (written *in* English), mathematical (*about* mathematics), chemical (*about* chemistry), Jewish (*about* Jews), Christian (*about* Christians), and Shakespearean (*inspired by* Shakespeare), where the *fundamentum divisionis* is surreptitiously but unmistakably altered.

The term "*Jewish* literature" thus stands once more condemned for its ambiguity, and we must therefore revert to my criterion of the Hebrew language as the basis of our definition of Hebrew literature.

There remains but one more question. How are we to deal with "Yiddish" literature? Not being written in pure Hebrew, it would at first sight appear that Yiddish literature should be excluded from Hebrew literature; and not being written in the languages of the world, it should equally not be included in the literatures of the world. Where, then, is its place? Here we seem to have a case which does not conform to the requirements of my test, and if it could be proved that it could not be made to fit in with my scheme, my definition of Hebrew literature would perhaps have to be seriously modified, if not entirely abandoned. But far from weakening my argument, I think the problem of classifying "Yiddish" literature strengthens my contention.

But first, what is "Yiddish"? The word is derived from the German *jüdisch* ("Jewish"), and usually denotes a strange compound of corrupt Hebrew and mediæval or provincial German, spoken by Jews, particularly in the eastern countries of Europe.[1]

[1] *Cf.* Leo Wiener, "History of Yiddish Literature in the Nineteenth Century"; Karpeles, op. cit., ii. 1000 *ff.*; "The Jewish Encyclopædia," *s.v.* "Dialects."

Is there a "Yiddish" literature? As there is a "Yiddish" language, we cannot reasonably deny the existence of a "Yiddish" literature.

In what relation, then, does "Yiddish" literature stand to Hebrew literature? Just as dialect literatures are included in the literatures of the major languages, so Yiddish literature should be included in Hebrew literature, *whenever it is written and printed in Hebrew characters.* The meaning and importance of the qualification in italics will become apparent later on. There is a Provençal language, and therefore a Provençal literature, but the minor Provençal dialect literature is absorbed by the major French literature. There is a Kailyard school of fiction, whose works are captured by English literature, and, in general, dialect literatures find their proper position in the literatures of their major languages. Similarly, Yiddish literature, *when written and printed in Hebrew characters,* must be regarded as a peculiar dialect literature of Hebrew, and should therefore be included in the major Hebrew literature. In support of this argument, it should be remembered that those who speak and write Yiddish entertain not the slightest doubt that Yiddish literature forms a branch of Hebrew literature.[1] They attach to Yiddish a sanctity almost equal to that

[1] Yiddish is thus affectionately termed *Mammi-loshon,* a hybrid of Polish and Hebrew, meaning *Muttersprache,* mother-tongue.

with which they regard Hebrew, and some go to the extreme length of calling Yiddish a "*heilige Sprache.*" Hence it happens that in the East End of London there is an institution, called the "Yiddishe" Talmud Torah, where the instruction is imparted in "holy" Yiddish, in opposition to the "English" Talmud Torah, where the teaching is given in "profane" English.

The case of Yiddish literature is thus extremely interesting, because it is an instance of a literature in a transitional stage, clinching and solving the whole problem with which we are concerned. We should not forget that although by "Yiddish" we usually understand Jüdisch-Deutsch, Kayserling has pointed out the existence also of a Jüdisch-Spanish and a Jüdisch-Portuguese literature,[1] and Bacher has described specimens of Hebrew-Persian literature.[2] Yiddish literature thus represents the early efforts of Jews to enter into the literatures of the world. As long as Yiddish works are written by Jews and printed in Hebrew characters, we have an indication that the authors in their own judgment do not yet feel themselves outside the domain of Hebrew literature.[3] But as soon as works in Yiddish

[1] e.g. *J. Q. R.*, xv. 112–114. [2] *J. Q. R.*, xiv. 116 *ff.*

[3] Since this article was written, the view adopted here has had a curious corroboration. Jews able to write Yiddish in Hebrew characters have been defined as prohibited immigrants into Cape Colony, because they were unable, in the words of

appear in non-Hebrew characters, Yiddish literature begins to cross the border, and a further stage is reached when Jews compose works in the pure languages of the world. Here we enter new territory; the divorce becomes absolute; the literary productions of the Jews in the languages of the world fall outside the scope of Hebrew literature proper, and have to be ascribed to the literatures of their respective languages. So that once more the language test is found to be the supreme and determining factor.

We have an excellent modern illustration of the principle just enunciated. Morris Rosenfeld has issued a volume of Yiddish poems, which, for reasons already stated, I claim should be placed under the heading of Hebrew literature. But Rosenfeld's attempts in English verse, and the English translations from his poetry made by Mrs. Henry Lucas,[1] belong to English literature, because written in English.

We may now summarise the whole discussion, by tabulating the cases which have to be considered, when marking the boundaries of either Hebrew or Jewish literature.

the Immigration Act, "through deficient education *to write out and sign in the characters of any European language*, an application to the satisfaction of the Minister." See the *Jewish Chronicle*, Feb. 13, 1903. My argument is not affected by the subsequent recognition of Yiddish as a European language. See the *Jewish Chronicle*, April 10, 17, and May 8, 1903.

[1] *J. Q. R.*, xii. 89–91, 264, 265.

(i.) Works written by Jews in Hebrew on any subject whatsoever.

(ii.) Works written by Gentiles in Hebrew on any subject whatsoever.

(iii.) Works written by Jews in languages other than Hebrew, but bearing on, or inspired by, Jews or Judaism.

(iv.) Works written by Gentiles in languages other than Hebrew, but bearing on, or inspired by, Jews or Judaism.

(v.) Works written by Jews in languages other than Hebrew, *not* bearing on, or inspired by, Jews or Judaism.

As indicated at the beginning of my paper, no barring limit is imposed as to time and place of composition, and every case given assumes the addition of the phrase "written in any country and in any age."

As a result of the definition with which he starts, that whatever is written by Jews is Jewish literature, Karpeles includes in Jewish literature (i.), (iii.), and (v.). He entirely ignores the consideration of problems (ii.) and (iv.), gives very inadequate and by no means proportionate treatment to (iii.) and (v.), and inconsistently describes the activity of some Gentile writers who properly fall under category (iv.), e.g. the Buxtorfs.[1]

[1] Op. cit., ii. 1030.

Be the conclusion I reach right or wrong, I claim my method to be the more complete one. I have dealt with all the possible cases, and in consequence of basing Hebrew literature on the Hebrew language, I exclude classes (iii.), (iv.), and (v.), and define Hebrew literature as consisting of (i.) and (ii.), i.e. the corporate mass of works written in Hebrew by Jews or Gentiles on any subject, in any country, and in every age. This I regard as the only real and consistent meaning to be attached to Hebrew literature, and the only way by which we can attain a well rounded-off discipline, to justify us in placing Hebrew literature among the literatures of the world.

Must we, then, entirely abandon the epithet "Jewish"? Such a course was proposed by H. Filipowski, who in 1867 founded the *Hebrew National*.[1] The aim of this journal was to exclude the words "Jew" and "Jewish" from all articles, and thus drive them out of existence, and invariably to substitute for them the term "Hebrew."

But the paper had but a brief career; only three numbers were issued, without the desired result having been achieved.

As the term "Jewish" seems to possess abundant vitality, can we not make some concession to popular usage? I have already explained why I think the

[1] Jacobs and Wolf, *Bibliotheca Anglo-Judaica*, No. 1283, p. 150.

expression "Jewish" literature to be erroneous, but I am prepared to sanction the expression "Jewish" history, because the word "Jewish" has a racial signification, and "Jewish" history may correctly be interpreted as the history of the Jews. But would it not be inconsistent to speak in the same breath of "Jewish" history and "Hebrew" literature? By no means. Classical scholars supply us with a strictly parallel case when they distinguish between *Roman* history and *Latin* literature. There were Romans as a people, but there was no Roman language. The language of the Romans was called Latin. Similarly, we Jews form a race, but we have no Jewish language. Our language is called Hebrew. We are thus entitled to speak of "Jewish" history but "Hebrew" literature. Nevertheless I prefer the term "Hebrew" as the epithet to be applied both to our history and our literature, and without attempting to resuscitate Filipowski's journal, I should like to advocate the revival of his idea. As Jews we are Hebrews, and Hebrew is perhaps the nobler term.[1] Besides, it is an unnecessary inconvenience to use two adjectives where one will suffice. Why speak of "Jewish" history and "Hebrew" literature, when the one epithet "Hebrew" can be correctly and legitimately applied to both history and literature? Even as applied to history, "Hebrew" is the better

[1] *Cf.* Zangwill on "Hebrew, Jew, Israelite."

term, because it covers the longer period of the annals of our race. *Hebrew* history begins with Abram the Hebrew;[1] Jewish history commences with the Exile, or at the earliest with the division of the kingdom.

And now I must draw my argument to a close. All I claim for my paper is, that it is the first consistent attempt to define the scope of what has hitherto been erroneously known as *Jewish* literature, but which I maintain should more correctly be called *Hebrew* literature. The solution of the problem I have suggested may or may not be the right one, but at all events I have proved to my own satisfaction, and I hope to yours also, that there is a real, deep, important, and by no means trivial meaning to be attached to the question with which I commenced—Is there a Jewish literature?[2]

[1] Gen. xiv. 13.

[2] This paper was criticised by Professor W. Bacher and the Rev. A. Wolf in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, January 1904. My reply to my critics is contained in the next essay—"What is 'Jewish' Literature?"

WHAT IS "JEWISH" LITERATURE?

READERS of Olive Schreiner's "Story of a South African Farm" will no doubt remember Mr. Bonaparte Blenkinsop. The boy-hero of the story has been devoting his untutored genius to the invention of a wonderful piece of mechanism. Mr. Bonaparte Blenkinsop asks to see it. He examines it very closely for a little while, then stamps on it and smashes it into pieces. "Looks nicer now, doesn't it?" he exclaims, with a brutal grin.

I readily exonerate my critics from the charge of displaying the deliberate cruelty of Mr. Bonaparte Blenkinsop, but, all the same, they have not treated my little effort with any excess of tenderness. Professor Bacher and the Rev. A. Wolf have evidently read my article with scrupulous care. They have subjected it to severe but valuable criticism, and I frankly pay tribute to the remarkable force with which they have presented the opposite view. It is in no spirit of obstinacy, however, that I still remain of my first opinion. They have failed to convince me of the error of my reasoning, but I am able to associate myself with them, and say

with them of my original contribution, "It looks nicer now, doesn't it?" For, had I the opportunity of restating my proposition at reasonable length, I am under the impression that I could utilise to advantage the supplementary data furnished by both of my critics, and with their help make my position almost impregnable. I should, however, be abusing the courtesy of the Editors, who have kindly provided me with the opportunity of having the last word, if I unduly trespassed on the valuable space of the *Jewish Quarterly Review*. I must therefore content myself with offering a few brief notes in reply, to clear up certain misconceptions. Perhaps in the end we shall find that at all events Professor Bacher and myself agree with each other to a greater extent than is apparent at first sight.

A.

The Rev. A. Wolf has criticised my system of investigation, but on examining the method he suggests I should have adopted, I find it to be exactly the one I pursued. I carefully enumerated the various classes of writings generally included under the designation "Jewish literature." I then found that, according to all analogies, Jewish literature had to be narrowed down to works written in Hebrew. I thereupon argued that the term

"Jewish literature," covering all works written by Jews in *all* languages, was not sufficiently appropriate to its actual application, and that therefore the expression "Hebrew literature" answered the purpose much better.

B.

What is the real reason why the view I advocate does not win ready acceptance? It lies in the fact that my critics are appalled by the mass of literature excluded by my definition. They seem to be haunted by the fear that what is thus shut out will be entirely neglected. They are naturally keenly anxious to avert such a danger, and so they widen the scope of Jewish literature beyond its true confines of Hebrew literature. "Only think what according to Levy does not belong to Jewish literature. The whole literature of Jewish Hellenism, the Arabic writings of the representatives of the Jewish spirit in the flourishing period of the Middle Ages, the works in which the modern science of Judaism was founded and developed in as far as they were not written in Hebrew, all these expressions of the Jewish spirit have not to be regarded as Jewish literature" (Professor Bacher).

But my anticipation of this objection seems to have escaped Professor Bacher's observation. "I hope no one thinks I am arguing against a cosmopolitan

taste in literature, and recommending that, even if we could, we should restrict our reading to works written in the Hebrew language. There are, of course, many contributions made both by Jews and non-Jews to the literatures of the world, which are not Hebrew literature because not written in Hebrew, but which we may nevertheless study with advantage, either as Jews or as children of the world" (supra, p. 72).

The truly cultured Jew, like the truly cultured man, aims at width of reading; but width of reading may cover different literatures. I may study Mappo in Hebrew literature, Heine in German literature, and Zangwill in English literature, but that would not justify me in classifying the works of these three authors under the heading of Hebrew literature. My critics retort that I should call them Jewish literature, because written by Jews; but, all the same, they have not satisfactorily explained why, in dealing with the literatures of the world, the epithet applied to the literature should be *linguistic*, and why in the case of Jewish literature the epithet should suddenly and exceptionally become *racial*.

In fact, Professor Bacher himself feels the difficulty of consistently maintaining that Jewish literature always connotes writings of Jewish authorship, and is compelled for a time to change the *fundamentum divisionis* from *race* to *subject-matter*.

"No one, for the greater fame of Jewish literature, will draw the circle of Jewish literature so large as to include in it the productions of Jewish writers, when the contents have no reference to Judaism. Süsskind von Trimberg, the German *Minnesinger*, well deserves mention in the history of the Jews, but his poems do not belong to Jewish literature, but form an integral part of German literature" (Professor Bacher).

Does not Professor Bacher in this passage come near to the adoption of my view? I never argued that Jewish authors who do not write their works in Hebrew should be excluded from Jewish *history*, but I did and do contend that non-Hebrew writings by Jews should not be included in *Hebrew literature*.

According to Professor Bacher, "Dreamers of the Ghetto" by Zangwill is Jewish literature, because it has reference to Jews or Judaism, but "The Master" by the same author is English literature, because it is not of Jewish interest. But why does Professor Bacher draw this distinction, if he holds that whatever is written by a Jew is Jewish literature? Mr. Wolf, on the other hand, would classify both as Jewish literature, because they are of Jewish authorship. Thus do my critics dispose of each other.

I am now able to turn the tables upon my critics. They think that, by limiting the scope of Jewish literature to Hebrew literature, I create the possibility of

Jews neglecting the study of the contributions made by Jews to the literatures of the world. But I can retort that, in consequence of Professor Bacher and Mr. Wolf ignoring the linguistic test of the boundaries of a literature, they are so enlarging the territory of Jewish literature, that Hebrew literature does not obtain its proportionate treatment. It is true that *en passant* Professor Bacher refers to the modern revival of Hebrew, but, on the whole, both of my critics attach little importance to the fact that the chain of Hebrew literature was not snapped by the schools of Mendelssohn and the French Revolution. Although I am here primarily concerned with the task of accurate definition, I may be permitted emphatically to point out that, in consequence of Jewish literature being interpreted as literature of Jewish authorship, the Hebrew literature of the nineteenth century has by no means received the earnest attention it so richly deserves.[1] It should be remembered that great Hebrew writers lived *after* Agamemnon. As far as I can gather, a Hebrew work of the nineteenth century rarely, if ever, finds a place in the curricula of theological seminaries, whether it be in England, on the Continent, or in America. Judging from my own limited reading, I think it not at all improbable, that the Hebrew literature of the

[1] This omission has been partly rectified by N. Slouschz, *La Renaissance de la Littérature hebraïque, 1743–1885* (Paris, 1902).

nineteenth century will be found to be of greater importance than the Judaica of the same period. And for this reason. Whereas all the Judaica of any permanent worth, e.g. Graetz and Güdemann, are at once translated into Hebrew, there is far less enterprise shown in rendering the valuable Hebrew literature of the nineteenth century into European languages. Before the "Jewish Encyclopædia" in English is half completed, the scheme for a "Hebrew Encyclopædia" is already launched forth, and the financial basis of the new undertaking fully guaranteed.

C.

It is interesting to note with what avidity both Professor Bacher and Mr. Wolf have pounced upon "Yiddish" literature as the weak spot in my armoury, *after* I myself had called attention to the difficulty of this instance.[1] "Yiddish" is, as a matter of fact, regarded by some as a dialect of Hebrew, and

[1] In this connection the following passage from Cairnes, "Logical Method of Political Economy," pp. 139–141, deserves mention: "It is no valid objection to a classification, nor, consequently, to the definition founded upon it, that instances may be found which fall or seem to fall on our lines of demarcation. The classification, and therefore the definition, is a good one, if in the instances which do *not* fall on the line, the distinctions marked by the definition are such as it is important to mark, such that the recognition of them will help the inquirer forward towards the desiderated goal."

by others it is classed as a European language. But Jews cannot have it both ways. The mass of Jews in Eastern Europe place it with Hebrew, and a Zionist thinker has recently argued, that in a Jewish state, Yiddish will have to be recognised as the national language on an equal footing with Hebrew.[1] According to this view, I am perfectly entitled to include "Yiddish" literature in Hebrew literature.

But if, on the other hand, as maintained by Professor Bacher and Mr. Wolf, Yiddish is a European language, then I am quite prepared to return Yiddish literature to the literatures of Europe. But it is important to note that, whichever conclusion be accepted, the validity of the linguistic test is not affected in the smallest degree.

D.

I have already expressed my appreciation of the value of the suggestions of both Professor Bacher and Mr. Wolf, but whereas Mr. Wolf to the end rigidly defends the extreme definition of Jewish literature as comprising all writings of Jewish authorship, Professor Bacher makes some weighty admissions in favour of my view, of restricting the scope of Jewish literature to Hebrew literature.

[1] A. Coralnik, "Der Kampf um die Sprache," in the *Jüdischer Volkskalender*, 5664, pp. 20–30.

I may modestly claim it as a great achievement, when a critic of Professor Bacher's eminence yields important concessions to my theory, points the way to a possible compromise, and practically takes a long step in the direction of ultimately accepting my position in its entirety.

Professor Bacher agrees with me in excluding from either Hebrew or Jewish literature, works written by Gentiles in languages other than Hebrew, although bearing on, or inspired by, Jews or Judaism. [Class (iv.) in my scheme, supra, p. 85.]

"Basnage's *Histoire des Juifs* and Franz Delitzsch's *Zur Geschichte der jüdischen Poesie* may find a place among the works of Jewish authors dealing with Jewish history and Hebrew poetry, but they must not on that account be classified as Jewish literature" (Professor Bacher).

By implication, Professor Bacher thus endorses my criticism of Karpeles, who describes the activity of Gentile writers like the Buxtorfs as falling within the range of Jewish literature.

Professor Bacher further accepts my contention that we should not include in Hebrew or Jewish literature works written by Jews in languages other than Hebrew, *not* bearing on, or inspired by, Jews or Judaism. [Class (v.) in my scheme, supra, p. 85.]

The issue between Professor Bacher and myself is now extremely narrow. We only differ as to the

classification of works written by Jews in languages other than Hebrew, but bearing on, or inspired by, Jews or Judaism. [Class (iii.) in my scheme, supra, p. 85.]

Professor Bacher is loth to shut them out from Jewish literature, but I feel no hesitation in excluding them from Hebrew literature. At all events, the fence between us is now cut down so low, that we shall probably soon shake hands over it in perfect harmony of view. Professor Bacher has already shown such generosity in his attitude towards my theory, by admitting the partial breakdown of the racial criterion of Jewish literature, that I feel justified in maintaining the linguistic test without any reservation, and in still holding that we should therefore more correctly speak of Hebrew literature.

MAIMONIDES—SEVEN CENTURIES AFTER

The year 1904 presents three striking illustrations of the infinite variety of the Jewish genius, for in it there occur the centenary of the birth of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, the tercentenary of the birth of Menasseh ben Israel, and the seven hundredth anniversary of the death of Moses Maimonides. It is with the last of these three great Jews that the present essay is concerned.

Modern text-books of Jewish history and literature definitely assert that Maimonides was born at Cordova on March 30, 1135, and died at Cairo on December 13, 1204; but the authors are by no means scrupulously careful to indicate that the exact dates of the birth and death of Maimonides were, until comparatively recent years, shrouded in complete uncertainty. We still have the right, if we feel so inclined, to challenge the dates generally accepted. In view of these doubts, one can hardly resist a smile on finding Graetz adding the minute fact, that Maimonides saw the light of day at one o'clock in the afternoon of the Eve of Passover, 1135.

It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, when Geiger published his researches on Maimonides, that scholars felt justified in laying down with some degree of confidence, when exactly Maimonides was born and died. But even assuming the writers of the first half of the nineteenth century, who preceded Geiger, had not the necessary data to enable them to venture to come to a definite conclusion, nevertheless their attitude is inconsistent and tantalising in the extreme. Thus in the *Hebrew Review*, edited by Morris J. Raphall, vol. i. (1834) p. 28, there is a footnote which runs as follows:—

"Rabenu Moses bar Maimon was born at Cordova, in Spain, in the year 1135, and died in Palestine at the age of seventy."

Yet a year later in the same *Review*, vol. ii. pp. 333, 334, in a series of articles on "The Origin and Progress of Literature amongst the Jews in Spain," there is a biography of Maimonides, which opens with these words:—

"*The precise period of his birth is doubtful*, some placing it in the year 1131, while others make him six years younger, and maintain that he was born in 1137; but though it is now impossible to decide which of these two dates is the true one, general opinion is in favour of the first."

Even Dr. A. Benisch, in his "Two Lectures on the

Life and Writings of Maimonides" (1847), writing with Geiger's investigations before him, also states that the date of birth is unknown. "The exact year of the birth of Maimonides is still the subject of dispute among the learned; none, however, date it before 1131, or after 1139" (p. 2). It is only in a note at the end of his work that Benisch deems it fit to mention that, according to Zunz, Maimonides was born on March 30, 1135 (p. 45). Then, again, on page 17, Benisch states that Maimonides lived sixty-nine years, nine months, and twelve days; but it is annoying to find that he omits to state the year of death, from which we might calculate the date of birth.

The mystery of this uncertainty is heightened and made more puzzling still, when we bear in mind the fact that, centuries ago, the date of birth was given as Nissan 14, 4895 (March 30, 1135), by Rabbi David, a grandson of Maimonides, in a postscript to Maimonides' Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud, Rosh Ha-shanah. It is surprising that this passage had not come within the ken of scholars by the beginning of the nineteenth century.

As to the date of the death of Maimonides, Monday, the 18th of Kislev, 4965 (November 12, 1204), the date given by Rabbi Saadiah ben Maimon ibn Danan, is usually disregarded, and it is now generally accepted, on the authority of Geiger's

Zeitschrift, that Maimonides died on the 20th of Tebeth, 4965 (December 13, 1204).

Thus, by traversing a circuitous route, during which we may have almost felt disposed to doubt whether Maimonides was born or died or lived at all, we arrive at the same result as modern historians, and are able to accept their verdict that Maimonides was born on March 30, 1135, and died December 13, 1204.

"The day of death is better than the day of birth." Whereas, in 1835, the seven hundredth anniversary of the birth of Maimonides escaped the notice of scholars, through insufficient knowledge or through careless investigation, in 1904, the seven hundredth anniversary of the death of Maimonides has already been commemorated, both formally and informally. The model biography of Maimonides, by Mr. Israel Abrahams and Mr. David Yellin, published in 1903, may be regarded as an informal commemoration, while the *Jewish Literary Annual* for 1904 is formally "dedicated to the memory of Moses Maimonides on the seven hundredth anniversary of his death."

But if in 1835 there was no conscious celebration of the seven hundredth anniversary of the birth of Maimonides, by a happy coincidence the *Hebrew Review* for 1834 and 1835 unconsciously celebrated the event, by paying a tribute to the memory of

Maimonides and to the perennial interest aroused by his teaching, by giving his biography and by publishing English translations of some of his writings. The biography, to which allusion has already been made, appeared in the number for August 28, 1835. In the second number of the *Hebrew Review*, October 10, 1834, was commenced a series of translations of the works of Maimonides, which included the *Hilchoth Deoth* ("Principles of Religious Philosophy"), the opening section of the *Mishneh Torah;* the *Shemonah Perakim* ("The Eight Chapters"), the Introduction to the Commentary on "The Ethics of the Fathers"; the Preface to *Chelek* [a Mishnah in Tractate Sanhedrin, so called from its opening leading word, "Every Israelite has a share (*Chelek*) in the world to come"], in which Maimonides formulates his famous Thirteen Articles of Faith; and Part III., Chapter xxii., of the *Moreh Nebuchim* ("Guide of the Perplexed"), dealing with the Book of Job. The last translation is from the pen of M. H. B. (M. H. Bresslau), and is introduced by the following interesting letter:—

To the Editor of the "Hebrew Review."

17*th June* 1835.

Sir,—Greatly as I admire your learned publication, I think there are many parts in the great work, *Moreh Nebuchim*, that would be in their right place when inserted in a review, the object of which is, not only to

translate Hebrew writers, but likewise to convince the public, that the ancient Hebrews are not all so hyper-orthodox as they are commonly called; but that many, even the great Maimonides, entertained notions which, although strictly in accordance with the spirit of Holy Scripture, are not tied to a literal explanation of every word thereof.

The *Moreh Nebuchim* being itself a translation from the Arabic, I trust you will make allowance if I have not succeeded in an elegant, but an exact and true, translation of the highly talented and philosophic author. I am, your obedient servant,

M. H. B.

28 Bevis Marks.

As already stated, we may regard it as reasonably established that Maimonides, or Rambam (from the initials of his name, *R*abbi *M*oses *b*en *M*aimon), was born at Cordova on March 30, 1135. His mother was the daughter of a butcher, and in making her his wife, Maimon was thought to have married beneath him, seeing that he was a creditable member of a scholarly family, which for seven successive generations numbered a *Dayan* ("judge") among its branches. Moses did not know a mother's tender love, for his mother died in giving him birth. When Maimon married a second time, on this occasion more in his own station of life, the child of his first union did not enjoy a particularly happy boyhood, and it is even related that, in consequence of ill-treatment, he once ran away from home. Legend also

has it that Maimonides was a dull boy, and only showed his intellectual capacity when he reached manhood. External cares combined with domestic sorrows to make the early years of Maimonides full of sore trial, and set in a background of pathos. In 1148 the Almohades ("Unitarians") invaded Andalusia and took possession of Cordova. Filled with a passion of religious frenzy, they compelled their subjects to adopt the faith of Islam, or accept the alternative of death or exile. Maimon seemingly shrank from apostasy, and with his family took up the pilgrim's staff, and travelled through Spain from place to place in search of rest and peace. Eventually, crossing over to North Africa, Maimon settled in Fez. Opinions differ as to the temporary apostasy to Islamism of Maimon and his household. But it may with fairness be asserted that without aggressively obtruding their Judaism, they refrained from being active resisters, and rather played the part of passive nonconformists. After about ten years of this precarious mode of existence, Maimon and his family wandered forth once more, and after many privations took up their abode in Fostat (Old Cairo) in 1165.

David, the son of Maimon, who was a diamond merchant, seems to have been the mainstay of the family, and left Moses free to pursue his Hebrew studies and take up the science of medicine. After

the death of his father and brother, Maimonides devoted himself most strenuously to the practice of the doctor's art, and was ultimately appointed to the important post of physician to the Vizir Alfahdel. He continued at the same time to be true to his love for the Torah and the Talmud, and by 1177 he appears to have been recognised as the spiritual head of the Jewish community in Cairo. By this time his fame had spread far and wide, and he led a very busy life. We have a graphic picture of his activity drawn by his own pen, in a letter sent to Samuel ibn Tibbon in 1199. The following extract from this letter is taken from Dr. H. Adler's translation in the *Miscellany of Hebrew Literature*, vol. i. (1872):—

"The following is my daily occupation. I dwell at Misr [Fostat], and the Sultan resides at Kahira [Cairo]; these two places are two Sabbath days' journey (about one mile and a half) distant from each other. My duties to the Sultan are very heavy. I am obliged to visit him every day, early in the morning; and when he or any of his children, or any of the inmates of his harem, are indisposed, I dare not quit Kahira, but must stay during the greater part of the day in the palace. It also frequently happens that one or two of the royal officers fall sick, and I must attend to their healing. Hence, as a rule, I repair to Kahira very early in the day, and even if nothing unusual happens, I do not return to

Misr until the afternoon. Then I am almost dying with hunger. I find the ante-chambers filled with people, both Jews and Gentiles, nobles and common people, judges and bailiffs, friends and foes—a mixed multitude, who await the time of my return.

"I dismount from my animal, wash my hands, go forth to my patients, and entreat them to bear with me while I partake of some slight refreshment, the only meal I take in the twenty-four hours. Then I attend to my patients, write prescriptions and directions for their various ailments. Patients go in and out until nightfall, and sometimes even, I solemnly assure you, until two hours and more in the night. I converse with and prescribe for them while lying down from sheer fatigue, and when night falls I am so exhausted that I can scarcely speak.

"In consequence of this, no Israelite can have any private interview with me except on the Sabbath. On that day the whole congregation, or at least the majority of the members, come to me after the morning service, when I instruct them as to their proceedings during the whole week; we study together a little until noon, when they depart. Some of them return, and read with me after the afternoon service until evening prayers. In this manner I spend that day. I have here related to you only a part of what you would see if you were to visit

me. . . . My time is, as I have shown you, excessively occupied."

In this wise Maimonides spent the remaining years of his life, and died in Cairo, December 13, 1204, having almost reached the Psalmist's limit of threescore years and ten. His remains were taken to Palestine and buried at Tiberias. The respect and affection in which he was held at once found expression in the popular judgment, "From Moses [the Prophet] to Moses [Maimonides] there arose none like Moses [Maimonides]."

In a sketch account of the literary activity of Maimonides, one must ignore his minor works and limit reference to his great trilogy—(*a*) the *Siraj* (Hebrew *Maôr*, "Light"), as the "Commentary on the Mishna" was called, 1168; (*b*) the *Mishneh Torah*, or Religious Code, 1180; and (*c*) the *Moreh Nebuchim* ("The Guide of the Perplexed"), 1190.

It is on these three works that the fame of Maimonides chiefly rests, and in the completeness of his life, in the vastness of his undertaking, and in the accomplishment of his self-imposed task, Maimonides may be compared to Herbert Spencer in modern times.

Dubnow, in his philosophical essay on Jewish history, gives the following critical estimate of the teaching of Maimonides:—

"The variety of mental traits [in the golden age

of Jewish literature in Spain] combined in a marvellous union to form the great personality of Maimonides, the crown of a glorious period. With one 'Strong Hand' [another name for the *Mishneh Torah*] this intellectual giant brought order out of the Talmudic chaos, which at his word was transformed into a symmetrical legal system; with the other he 'guided the perplexed' through the realm of faith and knowledge. For rationalistic clarity and breadth of view no counterpart to the religio-philosophic doctrine which he formulated can be found in the whole extent of mediæval literature. The main feature of the philosophy of Maimonides, and of the systems based upon it, is rationalism—not a dry, scholastic, abstract rationalism, but a living rationalism, embracing the whole field of the most exalted psychic phenomena. It is not philosophy pure and simple, but religious philosophy, an harmonisation, more or less felicitous, of the postulates of reason with the dogma of faith. It is reason mitigated by faith, and faith regulated by reason."

But Dubnow just misses pointing out the odd paradoxes and contradictions of Maimonides' writings. It was part of the aim of the commentary on the Mishnah to vindicate freedom from hasty dogmatism, religious intolerance, and hide-bound traditional interpretation; yet in this very work Maimonides appears as the first great Rabbi to lay down a rigid

creed and to formulate the famous Thirteen Articles of the Jewish Faith.

Again, the *Mishneh Torah*, with its half-veiled attempt to depose the Talmud, virtually struck a blow at intellectual honesty by suppressing references to sources. It is no doubt convenient to have a compendious guide to the Talmud and traditional lore, and a succinct account of Jewish religious practice, but the genius of Judaism always rebels against the stifling of progress and the supremacy of codified dogmatism. In providing a key to the Dædalian maze of the Talmud, Maimonides attempted to carry out a laudable object; but in aiming at the displacement of the Talmud, he committed a grievous fault. It is, therefore, not so very remarkable that the *Mishneh Torah* met with serious opposition. What is exceedingly curious is the fact that it is still respected as possessing great authority. This is probably due to the circumstance that the critics of Maimonides supplemented his omission, by verifying the quotations and sources, and providing the reader with the necessary means for arriving at an independent judgment. It is interesting to recall that Maimonides was hoist with his own petard, for in a letter addressed to Rabbi Pinchas of Alexandria, he admitted his inability to find again the sources on which he had based some of his decisions.

The "Guide of the Perplexed" was an attempt to reconcile Faith with Reason.

"My theory aims at pointing out a straight way, at casting up a high road. Ye who have gone astray in the field of the Holy Law, come hither and follow the path which I have prepared. The unclean and the fool shall not pass over it. It shall be called the Way of Holiness."

Maimonides did not pretend to hope that the "Guide" could or would appeal to the multitude, and in forwarding the work to his favourite disciple, Joseph ibn Aknin, he felt he had found a kindred soul fit to receive his inmost thoughts.

"When I find the road narrow, and can see no other way of teaching a well-established truth except by pleasing one intelligent man and displeasing ten thousand fools, I prefer to address myself to the one man, and to take no notice whatever of the condemnation of the multitude."

In the *Moreh Nebuchim*, Maimonides committed the fundamental error of enunciating a theory of Judaism in harmony with an ephemeral system of Aristotelian philosophy, just as in recent years the serious blot on the "Ethics of Judaism," by the late Professor Lazarus, is the attempt to systematise Jewish ethics on the basis of Kantian principles.

In the expression of his thoughts, Maimonides had the gift of lucidity, but none of the graces of style.

His language is grim, rigid, and precise. He was a great codifier, skilful in bringing order out of chaos, but he showed no æsthetics of exposition. His treatment is rarely touched with the glow of beauty or imagination, or moved with rhythmic passion. His sympathies were severely intellectual. He took no delight in poetry, and is one of the few Jewish scholars of Spain who did not enrich our garden of Hebrew verse. Even poems for the liturgy do not seem to have found favour in his sight.

It has been found necessary to dwell more on the demerits than on the merits of the teaching of Maimonides, in order to assist in restoring the balance in our historical judgment of his appropriate place in Jewish thought. For some historians have been too prone to deify Maimonides, to ascribe verbal inspiration to his writings, and to characterise his opponents as the foes of light and science. But it is highly desirable that the proper perspective should be observed, that all the anti-Maimonists should not be labelled as the allies of darkness and obscurantism, and that it should be pointed out that on the whole there was method and robust sense in their criticism.

But we must not allow the pendulum to swing too much to the other extreme. In spite of his faults, Maimonides was a great figure on the Jewish literary horizon, and has left an enduring name among the great religious leaders of Judaism. He was pene-

trated by a profound and immovable belief in the Divine direction of human affairs, and in God's protecting care for His people Israel. He may have been a champion of a lost philosophy, but he was also the advocate of a vivid and vivifying faith which still persists. We honour ourselves in commemorating the seven hundredth anniversary of his death, and in keeping green the memory of a great worthy in the roll of the men of light and leading in the annals of Judaism.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Dr. M. Friedländer's introduction to his translation of the "Guide of the Perplexed," and the biography of Maimonides by Mr. Israel Abrahams and Mr. David Yellin, are so rich in valuable notes, that they almost provide a complete Maimonides bibliography, a task beyond their real scope. The following works, not directly mentioned in these two books, may be noted here, as an aid to any future compilation of a Maimonides bibliography:—

(A) General

L. Bardowicz, *Die rationale Schriftauslegung des Maimonides*, 1893.

J. Bukofzer, *Maimonides im Kampf mit seinem neuesten Biographen P. Beer*, 1844.

M. Eisler, *Vorlesungen über Philosophie und Religion des M. Maimonides*, 1870.

I. Finkelscherer, *M. Maimunis Stellung zum Aberglauben und zur Mystik*, 1894.

L. Grossman, *Maimonides*, 1890.

I. Muenz, *Die Religionsphilosophie des Maimonides und ihr Einfluss*, 1887.

D. Rosin, *Die Ethik des Maimonides*, 1876.

(b) English Translations

Maimonides has been particularly fortunate in his English interpreters. In addition to the translations quoted in the above article, the following deserve mention :—

Thoughts and Aspirations of the Ages (edited by W. C. Coupland), *s.v.* "Judaism." Extracts from the *Eight Chapters*.

Robert Young, *Book of the Precepts*, 1849.

Hermann Hedwig Bernard, *Selections from Yad Hachazak of Maimonides*, 1832.

Elias Soloweyczik, *The Book of Knowledge*, 1863 ; *Hilchoth Melachim*, 1863.

J. W. Peppercorne, *The Laws of the Hebrews relating to the Poor and the Stranger*, 1838.

Robert Clavering, *Hilkot Talmud Torah and Teshubah*, Oxford, 1705.

James Townley, *The Reasons of the Laws of Moses from the "More Nevochim" of Maimonides*, 1827.

J. Abelson, "Maimonides on the Jewish Creed" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, October 1906).

BISHOP BARLOW ON THE "CASE OF THE JEWS"

In 1692 there appeared a work entitled "Several Miscellaneous and Weighty Cases of Conscience, learnedly and judiciously resolved by the Right Reverend Father in God, Dr. Thomas Barlow, late Lord-Bishop of Lincoln."

Included in this collection of essays is "The Case of the Lawfulness of the Toleration of the Jews." This interesting pamphlet is not mentioned in Jacobs and Wolf's Bibliography, but my attention was drawn to it by Mr. Lucien Wolf, who kindly lent me his copy of the book for the purpose of writing this paper.

A "case of conscience" is defined by Whewell,[1] as a question of conduct, in which apparently conflicting duties seem at first to perplex and disturb the moral faculty, and make it necessary to trace, with a careful exclusion of everything *but* moral considerations, the *consequences* of the rules of

[1] Whewell, "History of Moral Philosophy" (1862), p. 21.

morality. In form and method a "case of conscience" is like the *Responsum* of some mediæval Rabbi. The Bishop uses the term "query" to introduce the statement of the problem, and "answer" when he proceeds to solve the difficulty. Sometimes the abbreviations "dub." for the Latin *dubium*, and "sol." for *solutio*, are found to indicate the same process of ecclesiastical reasoning.

There is no difficulty in assigning an approximate date to this essay. From the editor's description of it, it "was writ at the Request of a Person of Quality, in the late troublesome Times, when the Jews made application to Cromwel for their Re-admission into England." We may therefore assume that it was composed towards the end of 1655, when Cromwell convened an assembly of lawyers and divines for the purpose of considering Menasseh ben Israel's petition.

Who may be the "person of quality" to whom Thomas Barlow delivered his opinion on this question? We know that during the Commonwealth Barlow was librarian at the Bodleian Library in Oxford. He was there regarded as a master of logic and philosophy, and was judged to be possessed of a profound knowledge of casuistry—"casuistry" in its original meaning, as the science of reasoning which enables a man to

decide in cases of conscience. Barlow had many distinguished associates and friends, and among his pupils was John Owen, the celebrated Independent, and Vice-Chancellor of the University during the Protectorate. It may be that Owen, when summoned to Cromwell's conference on the re-admission of the Jews, consulted Barlow, and the pamphlet under notice may have been Barlow's reply. But "a person of quality" is hardly a suitable epithet to apply to a clergyman. An ecclesiastical title would have been much more appropriate.

Besides, there are better reasons for seeking to identify with this "person of quality" Robert Boyle, famous as one of the founders of the Royal Society. Robert Boyle's devotion to theology was not less than his love for science. Barlow and Boyle were on terms of great intimacy. In the volume in which the "Case of the Jews" appears is also "The Case of Toleration of Christian Dissenters, . . . written to, and at the request of the Honourable and Learned Mr. Robert Boyle, 1660, soon after the Restoration of K. Charles II." A query on the question of the toleration of the Jews would be just what we might naturally expect as coming from the same quarter. And the following passage from Birch's Life of Boyle shows that Boyle was in the habit of con-

sulting Barlow on many such points concerning religion :—

"But one of his [Boyle's] most intimate friends, with whom he conversed upon theological points, was Dr. Thomas Barlow, then chief library-keeper of the Bodleian Library, and afterwards Bishop of Lincoln. The Doctor was a man of prodigious reading and a proportionate memory; he knew what the fathers, schoolmen, or canonists had said upon any question in divinity or case of conscience, and being with all these accomplishments very communicative of his knowledge, he gained the highest degree of Mr. Boyle's esteem and friendship, who used as long as he lived *to consult him upon cases of conscience*, wherein he was sure at the same time of learning all that had been hitherto urged upon the question proposed to Dr. Barlow, many of whose answers are still extant."[1]

It may then be asked, Why did the editor make such a definite assertion about "The Case of Toleration of Christian Dissenters" being addressed to Robert Boyle, and such a vague reference about the "Case of the Jews" being written "for a person of quality," if our surmise be correct that they were both composed for the same person?

The essays themselves supply the answer. In the "Case of Toleration of Christian Dissenters" Barlow expresses his opinion in the form of a

[1] Birch's "Life and Works of Robert Boyle" (new edition), i. 56.

letter definitely dedicated to Robert Boyle, whereas the "Case of the Jews" contains no indication whatever as to whom it was meant for. As published at present, the "Case of the Jews" does not even state that it was written "at the request of a person of quality." We must therefore assume that the editor's assertion to that effect must have been based on some evidence now lost, or that originally the essay had some such superscription now transferred to the publisher's preface.

The editor himself was unable further to specify the "person of quality," as both Boyle and Barlow died in 1691, the year before the tracts were published. For, as he says in the preface, "now though the Bishop gave these cases to his friends, when first writ, with his leave to print them; yet they, fearing that some of them might prejudice his further promotions in the Church in those days, forbore publication of them."

It must also be remembered that the "Case of the Jews" was composed when Robert Boyle was an unknown undergraduate. As Robert Boyle had not yet made his reputation in the literary and scientific world, the description "written at the request of Robert Boyle" would not have produced such an effect as the vaguer title "writ at the request of a person of quality."

In further support of the contention that the

"person of quality" is identical with Robert Boyle, it may be urged that the authorship of an anonymous pamphlet entitled "Reasons why a Protestant should not become a Papist, . . . by a Person of Quality," is generally ascribed to Robert Boyle.[1] It is not unfair to conclude that the "person of quality" *by* whom this pamphlet was written, and the "person of quality" *for* whom the "Case of the Jews" was composed, are identical, and that Robert Boyle is the individual referred to in both instances.[2]

With regard to the "Case of the Jews" itself, we may say that the arguments used by the Bishop in favour of the re-admission of the Jews are based on expediency rather than on principle. There is no advocacy of liberty of conscience as such. There are only appeals for admitting the Jews on the ground of pecuniary advantage to the State or spiritual gain to the Church in the possible conversion of the Jews. There is more worldliness than other-worldliness in Barlow's doctrines. Barlow was an adept in the art of making obedience to

[1] Halkett and Laing's "Dictionary of Anonymous Literature," vol. iii. col. 2095; *Notes and Queries*, 3rd series, vol. iii. (1863), p. 214.

[2] Mr. Lucien Wolf ("Menasseh ben Israel's Mission to Oliver Cromwell," p. l.) is of opinion that the "Case of the Jews" was drawn up by Barlow at the request of Dr. Goodwin, who was a member of the Whitehall Conference.

the dictates of religion coincide with an enlightened pursuit of self-interest. He was an opportunist, and was called a "trimmer," because he always managed to find favour with the leaders of different régimes. He held high office either in the University or in the Church during the Commonwealth, during the reign of Charles II., and again in the critical days of James II. His "Case of the Jews" fully reflects his character. The peroration of the tract shows the author's insinuating manner: "I wish the chief magistrate could admit them on these terms, for so they, and all theirs (*omnia sua*) should be *suum proprium*, which possibly might supply him with money, and so save taxes. And upon these terms I (and I believe everybody else) will willingly consent to their re-admission" (pp. 74, 75).

Although the question is very rarely raised above the level of expediency, and the general tone of the essay is not too high for a "right reverend father in God," the reasoning is masterly in arrangement, and the arguments follow one another in the most effective manner. Without altering a word, the whole pamphlet could easily be divided into chapters and sections. On a first reading one would think that the force of some propositions would be increased by a slight rearrangement of sentences. But a few experiments in such revision

soon convince one that the Bishop is right in the order he adopts.

It has already been shown that Barlow was of opinion that the Jews should be re-admitted because of the pecuniary advantage which would accrue to the State from their residence in this country. We shall now see how he tries to prove that the re-admission of the Jews would be in the interests of the Church:—

"I think that there lies a sacred and heavy obligation upon Christians . . . to endeavour the conversion of the Jews, which certainly cannot be by banishing them from all Christian commonwealths. And therefore they must either go to the Jews or bring the Jews to them. . . . Now these two are both one, . . . for certainly if it be lawful for us to go and live amongst the Jews to preach the Gospel, then it will be as lawful to bring them hither, and let them live amongst us to the same purpose" (pp. 46, 47).

In the course of his thesis Barlow discusses the two propositions considered by Cromwell's convention—(i.) whether it be lawful to re-admit the Jews; and (ii.) if the re-admission of the Jews be legal, what restrictions should be placed upon their liberty. On both points Barlow's answers are clear and definite. There *is* a law against the re-admission of the Jews, but if the State think it advisable to repeal the law, there is no authority

against such a course of procedure being pursued. As it would be beneficial to allow the Jews to settle again in England, Barlow declares that permission should be given to the Jews to return, but with such limitations to their freedom as they have been accustomed to in other countries. He then enumerates some of the conditions on which the Jews were allowed to dwell in other lands, and which he thinks should apply to the Jews in England, should they be re-admitted. The following are some of the most striking restrictions mentioned:—

"No toleration should be given them to speak anything blasphemously or impiously against the Gospel."

"Let them profess, but not propagate their religion."

"They were not permitted to carry any office or dignity in the Christian commonweal."

"They were not permitted in any suit or difference between a Jew and a Christian to draw the Christian or his cause before a Jewish magistrate."

"They were never permitted to make marriages with Christians."

"If any of the Jews turn Christian, in case the Jews endeavoured to seduce him and maliciously injured him, they were to be burned for it."

"They might repair their old synagogues, but were not tolerated to build new."

"By the Canon Law they might not come abroad on Good Friday."

"They were not permitted to wear garments exactly of the Christian fashion, but were to have distinct habits, that all might know them to be Jews."

"They might not be physicians or give physick to any Christian."

"They should be enjoyned to admit of friendly collations and disputations sometimes about Gospel truths, and not obstinately to reject all means of conversion and conviction, and satisfaction of those seeming reasons which keep them off from embracing the truth: for there will be little hopes (or possibility) of their conversion if they be permitted obstinately to refuse all means of doing it."

These are some of the noteworthy features of the pamphlet, which is seventy-eight pages long; but there are many incidental questions raised and disposed of in a skilful and diverting way. It will be seen that the "Case of the Jews" is full of interest, and is an historical item not to be despised in drawing up a systematic account of the return of the Jews to England.

JOHN DURY AND THE ENGLISH JEWRY

John Dury was a seventeenth-century divine who set himself the ambitious task of uniting the different sects of the Protestant churches. He recognised that there were grave difficulties to be overcome and obstinate prejudices to be removed before his ideal could be attained, but he firmly believed that those difficulties were not insuperable nor those prejudices ineradicable. So he became a wandering Churchman, turning up in the most unexpected places, making desperate efforts to realise his winsome and majestic ideal. In an age of intellectual complexity, religious unrest, and political change, people were attracted by his singular spirit of devotion, his simplicity of purpose, and his honesty of conviction. Many were persuaded by his genuine earnestness that *his* was a practicable scheme capable of early realisation.

But if in some quarters he met with kindly encouragement, like all idealists he had to submit to a full measure of ridicule. Thus Prynne, with characteristic bitterness, calls him "the Time-serving

Proteus and Ambidexter Divine." But as we know Prynne, we can sympathise with Dury. Like that of many a dreamer, Dury's life might have closed in the shadow of grief at the thought of a noble purpose unfulfilled, had it not been for his never-failing optimism. He contended for victory, but amid and after defeat he refused to acknowledge himself vanquished. He never renounced his fond hope, and even a few days before his death he was engaged in preparing fresh plans for the promotion of ecclesiastical peace. Dury was unquestionably a sincere and striking individuality, and in his peculiar way quite a European celebrity.[1]

But his interest for Jews lies in the fact that in 1656 he wrote a long letter on the question whether it was "lawful to admit Jews into a Christian Commonwealth." This pamphlet belongs to the class of literature known as "Cases of Conscience."[2] The object of the present paper is to trace the external history of Dury's pamphlet, and then to examine the internal value of his contribution to the discussion of the Jewish question in the time of Cromwell.

To make our narrative consecutive, we must now introduce a contemporary of Dury, viz. Samuel Hartlib. Samuel Hartlib was an amiable busybody,

[1] Masson's "Life of Milton," ii. 367.

[2] See supra, p. 115.

possessed of mediocre ability as a writer, who undeservedly enjoyed the friendship of some of the ablest men of letters of his day. He has been called the friend of Milton, which on closer examination of the real circumstances means that Milton befriended him. It says much for Hartlib's perverse cleverness that Milton should have frequently given him financial assistance, and afterwards practically have expressed his gratitude for that inestimable privilege. Hartlib was the progenitor of the modern autograph-hunter, but at least he could always count upon success. He could boast of the fact that great authors conducted a correspondence with him, which now only amounts to this, that they were possessed of sufficient courtesy and good nature to reply to his letters. Among Hartlib's so-called friends, besides John Milton, were two other Johns, John Dury and John Worthington, a great theologian, who for some time was Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. In Worthington's Diary and Correspondence, which reflect and retain clear images of the lives of some of his contemporaries, there are to be found several communications from Hartlib, which make mention of Dury's movements at interesting points in his career.

The visit of Menasseh ben Israel to London in 1655 created some stir, and the literary world became interested in the mystic Rabbi. At the time of the

Whitehall Conference, Hartlib lived at Charing Cross, and Menasseh was staying in the Strand.[1] Without an undue stretch of historic imagination, we may assume that Hartlib and Menasseh met more than once in their daily walks along the Strand. In our mind's eye we can see Hartlib button-holing Menasseh, and getting more out of Menasseh than Menasseh could get out of him. Hartlib hears of the proceedings at Whitehall, and with his usual inquisitiveness writes to Worthington for more definite information, which Worthington could well supply, as two of his friends, Ralph Cudworth and Benjamin Whichcote, were prominent members of the conference convened by Cromwell. Hartlib's letter to Worthington is dated December 12, 1655, and is addressed from Charing Cross:—

"This day is the great meeting about the Jews, but I had rather hear the issue from your relations than give it to you. I suppose our friends that are members of it will write freely and impartially of that business."[2]

In addition to the problem raised by Menasseh's petition, there was evidently a proposal put forward that the Karaites should be invited to take up their abode in England. So in the same letter to Worth-

[1] See *Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England*, iii. 144 *et seq.*

[2] Worthington's "Diary," i. 78.

ington, Hartlib refers to this idea, and in order to provoke a discussion and elicit Worthington's opinion, expresses himself in favour of it:—

"I am for Mr. Borel's Judaical studies and undertaking, and that the Caraites might be invited hither and encouraged, being such as begin to look towards their engraffing again."[1]

While the agitation raised by Menasseh's enterprising mission was at its height in England, John Dury was at Cassel in Germany, busily occupied in the promulgation of his own scheme. But nothing loth, Hartlib relentlessly pursues him by letter, and urges him to forward, with all possible speed, his views on the two questions then being discussed in fashionable London society—the suggested invitation to the Karaites and the proposed admission of the Jews.

Dury was a model correspondent. Burdened as he was with work in connection with his own plans, he made time to reply to Hartlib without delay, his letter being dated "Cassel, in haste, Jan. 8th, 1656." The receipt of this important communication constituted one of Hartlib's triumphs in drawing the opinion of a great mind, and Hartlib wasted no time in letting the world know of his possession of such a coveted pamphlet. Appropriately enough, Worthington was one of the first to receive a

[1] Worthington's "Diary," i. 78.

copy, as is shown in the following letter, March 10, 1656:[1]—

"I wish we were more modest in declaring for the Protestant cause, nor do I know of any course which Mr. Borel takes about the Caraites. I desired Mr. Dury to give me his advice about them and to resolve the Case of Conscience, which he hath done, as you will find in the adjoined packets, which is presented to your kind acceptance by him who concludes always with the subscription of Sr.

"Yours in all possible duties of love and service,

"S. Hartlib."

Dury's letter to Hartlib must have attracted a good deal of attention.[2] We know that during the Commonwealth authors were averse to having their favourable opinions of the Jews published. So there must have been an immediate demand for Dury's pamphlet, otherwise it is scarcely probable it would have been printed as early as June 27, 1656, with the following explicit title: "A Case of Conscience; whether it be lawful to admit Jews into a Christian Commonwealth? Resolved by Mr. John Dury. Written to Samuel Hartlib, Esq. London, 1656."

[1] Worthington, i. p. 83.

[2] Dury was for a time erroneously regarded as the translator of "The Hope of Israel." See Lucien Wolf, "Menasseh ben Israel's Mission to Oliver Cromwell," p. 67.

Having traced the origin of Dury's pamphlet on the Jewish question of 1655, we may now proceed to examine its internal worth.

At the outset Dury expresses his doubts whether he has any right to answer a question which does not strictly come within his province. The admission of the Jews is a civil difficulty, not a religious problem.

"It is a work which the civil magistrate takes wholly into his own consideration, to do or not to do therein, what he finds expedient for the advantage of the state; nor do I remember to have read or heard that the case hath ever been put to any of the churches, to be scanned as a matter of conscience."

Dury also urges that, being away from England, he does not possess sufficient data to guide him in his judgment, and it is only in deference to Hartlib's wishes that he feels justified in setting forth his views on the matter.

"Although particular persons, to whom the judgment doth not belong, ought not to meddle beyond their line in the business, yet being required to contribute their assistance and advice how to frame things in a way towards them which is most expedient, they ought not to refuse it. Therefore I also shall put in my mite among the rest; although I am at a great distance for the present, and cannot know how things stand at home."

The question of the advisability of inviting the Karaites is dismissed briefly, almost contemptuously, in a postscript:—

"To call in the Caraites would fright away these; for they are irreconcilable enemies. Time must ripen these designs and prudence may lead them on."

The same postscript is worthy of notice as containing Dury's one definite reference to Menasseh ben Israel:[1]—

"Our state doth wisely to go warily and by degrees in the business of receiving them. Menasseh ben Israel's demands are great; and the use which they make of great privileges is not much to their commendation here and elsewhere. They have ways beyond all other men to undermine a state, and to insinuate into those that are in offices, and prejudicate the trade of others; and therefore, if they be not wisely restrained, they will in a short time be oppressive, if they be such as are here in Germany."

Leaving this Parthian postscript, we turn back to the main letter, which is much more impartial, and much more favourable to the Jews. Dury resolves the question in the following way. He says it is clear to him that, if the question be put in general

[1] For Dury's correspondence with Menasseh ben Israel, see Lucien Wolf, "Menasseh ben Israel's Mission to Oliver Cromwell," Introduction, xxiv.–xxvi.

terms concerning the lawfulness of admitting them, the answer cannot be other than affirmative. But if the question be made concerning the expediency of admitting them at such and such a time, in this or that place, upon these or those terms, then he supposes the great rules of expediency are to be observed. If in the circumstances of their admission nothing be found contrary to those rules, but all can be made

(I.) consonant to the glory of God,
(II.) to the edification of others,
(III.) without danger of offence, and
(IV.) without bringing a yoke upon the original inhabitants of the land,

then their admission will be judged not only lawful but also expedient.

If then the question be, how their admission may be so circumstantiated as to answer the fore-named rules of expediency, he would advise thus:—

I. To advance the glory of God by their admission, he conceives they must be restrained from some things, and may be fairly induced to some other things.

The things from which they must be restrained are chiefly these:—

(i.) Not to blaspheme the person of Jesus.
(ii.) Not to go about to make proselytes.

(iii.) Not to profane the Christian Sabbath.

(iv.) Not to dishonour any of the ordinances of Christianity.

The things whereunto they may be fairly induced are, as he conceives, these:—

(i.) To hear Christians concerning the grounds which they have for Christianity.

(ii.) To declare to Christians the grounds of all their Jewish faith and practice.

(iii.) To avoid on both sides all contradictory disputes on those conferences, and not to trouble any of the weaker sort of either side with the matters to be handled therein, but only to set them afoot amongst a few of the Rabbis of each side in a friendly way.

II. Then Dury shows how the second rule of expediency may be carried out, to advance the edification of the Christians by the admission of the Jews.

III. In explaining how to carry out the third rule of expediency, to avoid offences between Jews and Christians, Dury says one way is for the Jews to conduct their worship in their own tongue.

IV. Finally, Dury points out how to obey the fourth rule, by avoiding the temporal inconveniences

which may arise from the covetous practices of the Jews, and their subtle capacity for trade.

This is in brief the substance of Dury's reply, which shows clear argumentation, piquancy of thought, and crispness of expression.

Dury's pamphlet will well repay perusal. Naturally in his wide travels Dury amassed a vast experience of the world and its ways. He had acute powers of observation, and thus we find him, for instance, giving interesting information about the habits of the Jews in Cassel and some of the towns in Switzerland.

It would perhaps have been unfair to expect Dury to have dealt with the question according to the inflexible standard of freedom of thought, but we ought freely to admit that the limitations proposed were, under the circumstances of the time, rather modest. It should not be forgotten that if Dury found himself compelled to recommend certain restrictions, he yet advocated sufficient liberty to make it worth the while of the Jews to come back to England.

I trust that this brief study in the byways of history has proved that we are justified in giving a kindly thought to the memory of this dreamer of the Church. His ideal of Protestant union may have been a will-o'-the-wisp, a mere vague and sentimental aspiration, but his conciliatory desire to destroy the

causes of religious strife prompted him to take a wider view and advocate the toleration of the Jews in a Christian commonwealth. He thus rendered valuable aid in furthering the possibility of the return of the Jews to England.

THE CHARM OF THE SEDER

When the Seder casts its soothing spell upon us, we sail over the ocean of poetry and romance, until we reach the enchanted island of Jewish childhood. The Jew's home is his castle, but on Seder evening the child usurps the place of the rightful lord and master, and "takes him by the hand." All the year round the child honours his parents, but on Seder evening parents honour their children. The Seder service is the Jewish child's first great object-lesson in loyalty to race and faith. The Seder recognises that the world is led by heart rather than by mind, that what is child-like is not necessarily childish, so it brings with it a softening and gentleness of mood, produced by the quickening of memory and old associations. Divers customs have been instituted for this night, their sole object being to stir the religious consciousness in the hearts of the young, to elicit their interest, and to provoke the eternal Why of intelligent childhood. The Torah anticipated the natural inquisitiveness of the Jewish child as to the origin and meaning of Passover. Thrice in the Book of Exodus, and once in the Book of Deutero-

nomy, does the Torah coach parents in the method of satisfying the curiosity of their children.

"And it shall come to pass, when your children shall say unto you, what mean ye by this service? That ye shall say, it is the sacrifice of the Lord's Passover" (Exod. xii. 26, 27).

"And thou shalt tell thy son in that day, saying: It is because of that which the Lord did for me when I came out of Egypt" (Exod. xiii. 8).

"And it shall be when thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying: What is this? That thou shalt say unto him: By strength of hand the Lord brought us out from Egypt" (Exod. xiii. 14).

"When thy son asketh thee in time to come, saying: What mean the testimonies, and the statutes, and the judgments, which the Lord our God hath commanded you? Then thou shalt say unto thy son: We were Pharaoh's bondsmen in Egypt, and the Lord brought us out of Egypt with a mighty hand" (Deut. vi. 20, 21).

The term *Hagadah*, the name for the book containing the order of service for Seder evenings, is derived from the Hebrew word for "And thou shalt tell" (Exod. xiii. 8), or "relate."

We may be more demonstrative than of yore in the expression of our emotions, but our feelings are not on that account more real and deep than the affections of the Jew of old, which were of that shy

yet fierce kind which shrink from detection. Still, to Jewish parents there never has been or can be music sweeter than the prattle of lips that lisp the syllables of *Mah Nishtano* ("Wherefore is distinguished"). So the Talmud lays down the rule that we should make haste to come quickly to the eating of Matsoh before the younger members of the family, throbbing with delicious expectancy and impatient to be filled with an exciting medley of new impressions and fresh ideas, succumb to nature's call and drop off to sleep.

In response to the questioning of the child, with its look and attitude all eagerness and attention, the father never forgot that in his children he lived again; he remembered the days of his own youth, dwelt with lingering fondness on the loveliness of innocent childhood, and with a strange selective poet-sense emphasised those events in the Hagadah which he felt bore upon his own story and worked them into his own life-drama. Under the vitalising touch of the Seder, the wife playfully ignored her husband, and she too made a hero of her child. The light of happiness came into her eyes as she nursed fond hopes of future greatness for her little ones. Nay, more, perhaps at her table was sitting one destined to redeem Israel, for every Jewess may cherish the ideal of becoming the mother of the Messiah.

There was to be no rigidity in the Seder ceremonial. The Hagadah was to be characterised by flexibility and adaptability to circumstances. It is only the invention of printing which has codified custom. The results are sometimes curious. For instance, the section beginning, "This is the bread of affliction," is written in Chaldee, and the Roman ritual has preserved throughout the more correct Chaldee words in place of occasional Hebrew expressions in our text. So that now we adopt the cumbersome method of reading *Ho Lachma* ("This is the bread") in the ancient Chaldee, the then Jewish vernacular, and afterwards rendering it into modern English. But, on the whole, sound common-sense has always characterised the Seder night observances. Unrehearsed incidents were never spurned. Thus it is related of the Maharil that one Passover eve his daughter asked, "Father, why hast thou raised the dish?" and he immediately proceeded to read, "We were servants of Pharaoh in Egypt." A spontaneous question had been asked, and under the circumstances, the Rabbi regarded the recital of Mah Nishtano as unnecessary.

A description of the table on Seder evening should be superfluous, but it should be noted that, although in memory of the destruction of Jerusalem it was forbidden, as a rule, to be lavish in the display of utensils for the meal, this prohibition was relaxed

on Passover, and the appointments for the table had to be the best a man's means could procure.

The Seder infused gladness into the soul, produced an indescribable sense of freedom, and wafted the scent of delightful ease. Hence arose the custom of reclining at table as a symbol of liberty, a practice derived from the Grecian and Roman habit of slaves at banquets sitting on lower seats than freemen. In spite of rigid insistence on obedience to the Fifth Commandment, and its extended application to include respect for teachers, on Passover eve a son might recline in the presence of his father, a disciple before his Rabbi, and a servant before his master. Either from a stern sense of feminine modesty, or out of respect to their husbands, the women were not required by law to recline at table, unless they could lay claim to some special distinction. But the Mordecai (thirteenth century) decided in favour of women adopting this custom, for "nowadays," says he, "all Jewesses are women of surpassing merit." Princely courtliness was to be the etiquette for the evening.

None were exempt by reason of age from the duty of reciting the Hagadah. It was a special "Mitzvah" to tell with wealth of detail the story of Israel's redemption from Egypt. The scene at Benei Berak was conjured up to show that familiarity need not breed contempt. It is ignorance which breeds in-

difference. R. Eliezer, R. Joshua, R. Elazar ben Azariah, R. Akiba, and R. Tarphon knew full well the history of the Passover, yet did they not return to the subject with renewed freshness, seek the Lord in an intimate and moving way, and see clearly into the Kingdom of Heaven? As they lovingly discussed the differences in the laws relating to the observance of Passover in Egypt, in the Temple, and in the Exile, night gave way to morn, and they were interrupted by their disciples reminding them that it was time to recite the Shema. So thoroughly could these Rabbis escape into a distant realm of history, with an undying admiration for the past, that a commentator writes: "Were it not that the hour of reading the Shema is fixed by law, they would have ignored the interruption, and continued to ponder on the miracle of Israel's deliverance."

The Seder night was characterised by proverbial Oriental hospitality. During meals it was the custom to keep the door open, and invite hungry persons to enter and partake of the fare. The punctiliousness of Rav Huna in this respect is specially noted in the Talmud (Taanith, 20b). We now open the door *after* the conclusion of the meal, and even after the saying of Grace, in connection with the reading of Psalm lxxix. 6, 7; lxix. 25; and Lamentations iii. 66, an expression of righteous wrath against the nations who have outraged ideals

and bemocked faith. It is as though Israel says with the Psalmist, "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate Thee? I count them mine enemies." Israel's enemies are God's enemies, for they are the friends of prejudice and ignorance and the foes of light and truth. It is usually a daughter of the house who opens the door at this juncture of the service. With ears strained to catch the faintest echo of sound in the world without, and peering wistfully into the darkness of night, she searches for some form to take luminous shape there; perhaps Elijah, the bringer of good tidings, for whom a cup is already prepared, or, as the folk-tale hath it, her own future bridegroom.

It is at this stage that exquisite slumber begins to steal over the young ones, and they are carried off to rest. And, when the house has ceased to echo with childish voices, there can be heard, through the hushed peace of the home, the lulling, crooning intonation of Israel's love-idyl, the Song of Songs. "He brought me to the banqueting house, and his banner over me was love" (Song of Songs, ii. 4). In due course, the adults also retire in a state of exaltation, still environed with the emotion of great poetry and sweet music. In this trance of feeling, they are not required to repeat the whole of the usual night prayers. They need no further words save the Shema itself, for

God will not suffer the destroyer to come in unto their houses to smite them (Exod. xii. 23). If it is Israel's watch-night, it is God's watch-night too. The Guardian of Israel neither slumbereth nor sleepeth. He will watch over Israel through the night of travail, until the dawn of the day which shall be the herald of a surer and more perfect joy to be, when the shadows of oppression shall flee away, when beyond this pain there shall be calm, when the reign of peace and truth shall begin. It is thus that the Seder closes, with smiles following upon tears, with sorrow and joy blended together in solemn beauty, and figures, draped in the pathos of exile and the dignity of persecution, finally fortified by hope. What a sublime expression of faith, a fitting epilogue to a ceremonial charged with memories and visions and strong with a mystic influence, the most poetic and impressive rite in the domestic religion of mankind.

THE SEVENTH NEW MOON

In the Bible the First of Tishri is never called the "New Year." Tishri is the seventh month of the Jewish year, and the First of Tishri was originally observed as the Feast of the Seventh New Moon. It is Nissan, and not Tishri, which really marked the commencement of the religious year. "This month [Nissan] shall be unto you the beginning of months; it shall be the first month of the year to you" (Exod. xii. 2). But in the process of time, owing to a plurality of causes to be described later, the First of Tishri acquired a more solemn significance than the First of Nissan, and although Nissan retained its position as the first month of the *religious* year, Tishri came to be regularly regarded as the beginning of the *civil* year. The history of the evolution of religious practices on the First of Tishri, resulting in this distinction between a religious and a civil year, is a charming instance of the manner in which popular choice fastens upon certain institutions, determines their characteristic features, and clings to its own rules for their due observance.

Being the day of the Seventh New Moon, the First

of Tishri was kept in the same way as any other New Moon. On every festival of the New Moon special sacrifices were offered, in addition to the ordinary daily sacrifice (Num. xxviii. 11–15), and the silver trumpets were blown at the offering of these special sacrifices just as on the days of gladness and set feasts (Num. x. 10). The Pentateuch does not prescribe further laws for the celebration of the New Moon, but it is clear from other passages in the Bible that the New Moon gradually became an important family and national festival. Domestic gatherings and tribal feastings were the order of the day (1 Sam. xx. 5–24), and on New Moon the people visited the houses of the prophets or sat at the feet of the wise to receive sacred instruction (2 Kings iv. 23), and later frequented the Temple to hear the word of God (Isa. i. 13, lxvi. 23 ; Ezek. xlvi. 1, 3). Hosea (ii. 3), Isaiah (i. 13, 14), and Ezekiel (xlvi. 1) all place the New Moon on the same religious plane as the Sabbath, and Amos distinctly implies that on the New Moon work and trade were strictly forbidden. "When will the New Moon be gone, that we may sell corn? and the Sabbath that we may set forth wheat" (Amos viii. 5). In the Temple, while the special sacrifices peculiar to the New Moon feast were being offered, the Levites chanted the Hallel, and the joy of the day had never to be marred by public or individual fasting (Judith,

vii. 6; Mishnah Taanith, ii. 10). Traces of some of these customs still survive, and to the present day we celebrate New Moon as a minor festival. Although in modern times abstention from work and trade is not enjoined, still as late as the Shulchan Aruch (*Orach Chayyim*, 417) mention is made of women refraining from work, and certain employments, like agriculture, not being pursued on the day of the New Moon.

In Bible times the ordinary observance of the New Moon would account for abstention from work on the First of Tishri, the additional sacrifices, and the blowing of the silver trumpets. Curiously enough, it is just these features common to the New Moon and the First of Tishri which, on closer examination, reveal striking points of difference. In the first place, whereas the prohibition of work on an ordinary New Moon is only inferred from passages in the Prophets, the law against labour on the First of Tishri is distinctly formulated in the Book of Leviticus (xxiii. 25). In the second place, on the First of Tishri extra sacrifices had to be offered even in addition to the special sacrifices for the New Moon, as we find in the Liturgy, "And ye shall offer a burnt offering for a sweet savour unto the Lord, *beside* the burnt offering of the New Moon . . . and the daily burnt offering." And in the third place, although the trumpets were blown on *every* New Moon, the *seventh*

New Moon is specifically described as "a day of blowing the trumpets" (Num. xxix. 1). We thus come to the first distinctive name of the First of Tishri.

The blowing of the trumpets, common to New Moon and the First of Tishri, was to be of primary importance in the latter case, and only of secondary importance in the former. How was the difference to be drawn? Should the trumpets used be of the same kind on both occasions, and the notes sounded different, or should the notes sounded be the same and the trumpets different, or should both trumpets and notes be different? In other words, what was the precise connotation to be attached to the terms "blowing" and "trumpets"? By the Talmudic rule of inference from "similarity of phrase," from a comparison of Lev. xxv. 9, and Num. xxix. 1, it was deduced that on the First of Tishri, as on the Jubilee Day of Atonement, the trumpet used should be a Shofar, "a horn," and that the seventh New Moon should be distinguished from an ordinary New Moon by the exceptional blowing of the Shofar. In the Temple both the silver trumpets and the Shofar were blown together, but the notes of the Shofar were prolonged beyond those of the silver trumpets, the special feature of the day being the blowing of the Shofar. In Jerusalem, before the destruction of the Temple, the trumpets

were sounded all day at periodical intervals from sunrise to sunset.

Josephus describes the silver trumpet as being a little less than a cubit in length. It was composed of a narrow tube, somewhat thicker than a flute, but with as much breadth as was sufficient for admission of the breath of a man's mouth; it ended in the form of a bell, like common trumpets. The Shofar used in the Temple on the Feast of New Year was a straight horn of a chamois, the mouthpiece of which was covered with gold. It was unlawful to make the Shofar of the horns of oxen or calves, because of Israel's sin with the golden calf, and for the same reason we no longer gild the mouthpiece of the Shofar. As a rule, the Shofar selected was a ram's horn, as a reminder of the ram sacrificed in the place of Isaac. "R. Abahu said, Why do we blow the ram's horn? It is as though the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded, Sound the ram's horn in order that I may remember in your favour the binding of Isaac and account it unto you as though ye had sacrificed yourselves unto Me."

What were the notes sounded on the Shofar? The "Teruah" is definitely prescribed, and the Talmud infers that every Teruah had to be preceded and followed by a "Tekiah." Originally, then, the order of blowing the trumpets was exceedingly

simple, a plain blast (Tekiah) announcing the commencement of the message, then the Teruah conveying the message itself, and finally another plain blast (Tekiah) indicating the end of the message. But inasmuch as the word Teruah occurs three times in connection with the First of Tishri and the Jubilee Day of Atonement — viz. Lev. xxiii. 24, xxv. 9, and Num. xxix. 1 — it was ordained that this series of Tekiah, Teruah, Tekiah, should be repeated three times, making in all six Tekioth and three Teruoth. What, then, is the origin of *our* order of "Tekioth"? All languages have words which lose their original meaning and acquire a new significance, and in Hebrew a similar fate befell the word "Teruah." At one time it bore its old Biblical meaning, but later it was interpreted by some as being equivalent to quite a different bugle-call known as "Shevarim," and by others as indicating a combination of Shevarim and the then Teruah. Thus, to escape doubt, a perfectly logical and mathematical series of combinations was instituted, by which, first, Tekiah, Shevarim-Teruah, Tekiah, had to be sounded three times; then, Tekiah, Shevarim, Tekiah, three times; and finally, Tekiah, Teruah, Tekiah, three times. This exactly corresponds with the practice which obtains universally at the present day.

Having solved this intricate problem of the evolu-

tion of our method of blowing the Shofar from that ordained in Holy Writ, we are free to perform the easier task of determining the general import of the practice of blowing the Shofar, and the specific meaning of the Teruah notes. The priests were commanded to blow the silver trumpets whenever the congregation of Israel had to be summoned to collective action, to meet in general assembly, to proceed on a journey or to march to battle, and the Teruah sounded was evidently the bugle-call of alarm. "Shall the trumpet be blown in a city, and the people not be afraid?" (Amos iii. 6). "My heart is disquieted in me; I cannot hold my peace, because my soul has heard the sound of the trumpet, the alarm of war" (Jer. iv. 19). The alarm sounded on the First of Tishri indicated the near approach of the great Day of Atonement and the Feast of Tabernacles, and served as a reminder to the people to prepare themselves for those days of solemnity and joy. The holiness of the "appointed seasons" of Tishri was reflected backwards upon the first of the month, and the seventh new moon thus became, in the words of Maimonides, a stepping-stone or preparation for the Day of Atonement, ushering in the Days of Penitence. Hence the name "the day of sounding the alarm," the day on which the blowing of trumpets on the New Moon of Tishri had more than its usual implication.

But the Torah is even more explicit as to the efficacy of blowing the trumpets. "When ye shall sound an alarm with the trumpets, it shall be to you for a *memorial* before your God; ye shall be *remembered* before the Lord your God, and ye shall be saved from your enemies" (Num. x. 9, 10). These verses give us the second name of the First of Tishri, viz. "a Memorial of the Blowing of Trumpets" (Lev. xxiii. 24), the day on which the blowing of trumpets makes God remember Israel with mercy. The appellation "Day of Memorial" is simply a slight variation or modification of the expression "a Memorial of the Blowing of Trumpets." But tradition has always attached a second interpretation to the name "Day of Memorial," and takes it in the sense that the day reminds God of the covenant He made with the patriarchs because of their abiding faith in Him. The Midrash and the Liturgy have developed this thought into the theory of the sustaining "merit of the fathers" (*Zekut Abôt*), and the fancy of Agadists and Paitanim plays long and lovingly on the enticing theme. But "the merit of the fathers" is "another story," and is far too big a subject to be discussed in an "aside." [1]

We have now to account for the displacement of the First of Nissan by the First of Tishri, which ultimately caused the latter to be regarded as "the

[1] See supra, pp. 14–42.

New Year." The observance of Passover in Nissan was always normal. But the Day of Atonement and the Feast of Tabernacles in Tishri were frequently the occasions of special celebrations. Tabernacles, as the Feast of Ingathering, marked the end of the harvest, and every seventh year was a year of solemn rest for the land. In this Year of Release all Israel assembled in Zion on the Feast of Tabernacles to hear the Law of God read by their king. Further, in Jubilee year, the great trumpet was blown to proclaim freedom to slaves and the return of lands to their original owners. When King Solomon dedicated the Temple in the seventh month, he arranged a grand national fête, and the double event of the celebration of Tabernacles and the consecration of God's house was long remembered for its exceptional brilliance. So much so, that although Nissan was the month from which technically the reigns of kings were counted, Tishri ever afterwards entered into successful competition with Nissan for that honour in the calendar. And we find the following change in the chronological method adopted in the Biblical narrative: "And it came to pass in the four hundred and eightieth year after the children of Israel were come out of the land of Egypt [*in Nissan*]" (1 Kings vi. 1). "And it came to pass at the end of twenty years, wherein Solomon *had built . . . the house of the Lord* [*in Tishri*]" (1 Kings ix. 10).

The influence of the Babylonian exile accentuated this tendency to count the year from Tishri. The Babylonian New Year commenced with Tishri, and the name Tishri itself is of Babylonian origin, meaning the "first" [month]. The return from the exile began in the Hebrew seventh month. "When the seventh month was come, the children of Israel gathered themselves together as one man to Jerusalem" (Ezra iii. 1), and "from the first day of the seventh month began they to offer burnt offerings unto the Lord" (Ezra iii. 6). It was also on the first day of the seventh month that the people assembled to hear Ezra read the Book of the Law, and Ezra said unto all the people, "This day is holy unto the Lord your God" (Neh. viii. 9). Thus it was that popular practice received religious sanction, *vox populi* became *vox dei*, and the Feast of the Seventh New Moon or the "Day of Blowing the Trumpets" emerged as the "New Year."

Such a transformation is not so remarkable as might appear at first sight. Strangely enough, September, which usually corresponds with Tishri, is an interesting instance of a change in the calendar, for it retains its old name, implying its former numerical position as the *seventh* month in the year (from the Latin *septem*, seven), instead of its actual present place as the *ninth* month. Further, the conditions of modern life are slowly producing in

the secular working year an alteration similar to that created by Tishri. The business summer holiday, resulting in temporary commercial stagnation, the school and university vacation, the law recess and the agricultural harvest, are gradually causing the practical year to be reckoned from autumn to autumn, instead of from January to December. This modern illustration will help us to understand how in ancient Israel, Nissan was still called the first month of the sacred year, while Tishri marked the beginning of the civil year.

There is one other name for the First of Tishri which we have not yet mentioned, viz. "the Day of Judgment." "The Day of Judgment" notion is post-Biblical, and is based on the tradition, adopted in the Liturgy, that the first day of Tishri was the first day of the Creation, upon the anniversary of which all mankind is judged by God. It is owing to this view that Hallel is not said on the New Year's Day. "Would it be appropriate for Israel to sing praises to God at the moment when, as Judge of the World, the Sovereign of the Universe is sitting on the throne of justice, with the book of the living and the dead open before him?" (*Rosh Hashana*, 32b).

"The Day of Judgment" theory has perhaps been pressed too far, and has produced too oppressive and depressing an effect on the nature of the New

Year observances. We are in consequence too apt to take this holy day sadly. As "An Englishwoman" writes in her "Love Letters": "How we love playing at grief and death—the two things that must come—before it is their due time." But after all, even if the Day of Atonement is rapidly approaching, we have but to scan the horizon more carefully to see the Feast of Tabernacles looming in the very near distance. And on the First of Tishri we might very well combine, as in the days of Ezra, the reflected joy of Succous with the reflected solemnity of the Day of Atonement, for although "this day is holy unto the Lord your God, mourn not, nor weep, neither be ye grieved, but let the joy of the Lord be your strength" (Neh. viii. 9, 10).

THE FEAST OF LIGHT

The Feast of Light has come again to tell its tale of deeds of daring performed in bygone days. Once more it bids us honour the memory of the Maccabees and emulate the fervour with which they held firm to ideals, acted upon with conviction and defended with bravery on the battle-field. This year Chanucah finds us more prepared than usual to listen to its story and message. Current events have predisposed our hearts to pay genuine and generous tribute to heroes and heroism, and to rejoice at victories gained in a right and good cause. Our blood warms with pride at the honourable part borne by Jews in a "unique" campaign, and our minds are ready to turn to those ages when Jews fought on their own land for hearth, home, and faith. But quite apart from the ephemeral stimulus of the sound of fife and the beat of martial drum, the celebration of Chanucah has long been winning its way to greater favour. This revival of the Feast of Light is more particularly noticeable in the growing number "at this season" of special services for the young. It is not difficult

to discover reasons why Chanucah should be so popular with children. Heroism, whether in fact or fiction, always appeals to the intelligence of the young as worthy of admiration and imitation. The figure of the aged Mattathias, uttering his confident challenge, "Yet will I and my sons and my brethren walk in the covenant of our fathers" (1 Macc. ii. 20), at once lays siege to childish affection. The loyal co-operation of the five brothers, working together to save Judaism, lends another touch of humanity to the struggle, which children can well understand and appreciate. Enthusiasm is further deepened when emphasis is laid on the fact that no mere fairy-tale is here related, but that the delightful story is really true, forming a definite chapter in the history of our race. To crown all, there is the brightness of the ceremony of lighting the Chanucah lights, with the accompanying hymn of "Maôz Tsur," sung in joyous tune.

The original celebration of the Feast of Light was marked by several features equally characteristic of the observance of the Feast of Tabernacles. It is exceedingly probable that, at the first institution of Chanucah, these elements were introduced as a compensation for their neglect on the previous Succous. The following passages from the Second Book of the Maccabees seem to support such a supposition.

"And now see that ye keep the days of the Feast of Tabernacles of the month Chislev" (2 Macc. i. 9).

"And they kept eight days with gladness in the manner of the Feast of Tabernacles, remembering how that not long afore, during the Feast of Tabernacles, they were wandering in the mountains and in the caves after the manner of wild beasts. Wherefore bearing wands wreathed with leaves, and fair boughs, and palms also, they offered up hymns of thanksgiving to him that had prosperously brought to pass the cleansing of his own place" (2 Macc. x. 6, 7).

Some of the laws and customs still adhered to on Chanucah are no doubt survivals of this ancient connection between Chanucah and Succous. Thus, both on Chanucah and Succous we recite the whole of the Hallel. The reading of the Law on both feasts presents a similar arithmetical arrangement of Biblical passages. The Haphtorah for Sabbath Chanucah begins with the words "Sing and rejoice" (Zech. ii. 14), reminding us of the Feast of Tabernacles, "the season of our Rejoicing." In the Temple, eight torches were kept burning at the ceremonial of drawing the water on Tabernacles. It is true that on Chanucah, according to our practice, we only light eight lights on the *last* night; but the parallel between Chanucah and

Succous is more strongly drawn in a discussion in the Talmud, where, according to one of the opinions mentioned, the proper custom is to light eight lights on *every* night of the feast.

After the destruction of the Temple, and throughout the Middle Ages, illumination became the chief feature of the celebration of the Chanucah. There are many regulations still extant indicating the supreme importance of lighting the lights. A poor man, dependent on charity for his daily bread, must go a-borrowing or sell his coat, in order to have the wherewithal to fulfil the precept of illumination. A man so destitute that he is compelled to decide between having the light for the Sabbath and the light for the Chanucah, must prefer lighting the Sabbath candles for the sake of domestic peace, because there can be no happiness in the home without the Sabbath light. But in the scale of duties formulated, if poverty compels a choice between the two, the light for Chanucah takes precedence over the wine for Kiddush or Habdalah. Seeing the Chanucah lights burning in the synagogue does not absolve one from the necessity of kindling them in one's home. If a man is away from home, and is not sure whether the Chanucah lights will be lit in his absence, he should, on seeing Chanucah lights in the place of his sojourn, recite the blessing, "Who wroughtest miracles"; and if it be the first

night of Chanucah he should add, "Who hast kept us in life." A traveller should pay his Jewish host a nominal sum of money, to be associated with him in the performance of the precept of illumination. If a traveller knows that the Chanucah lights will not be lit in his own home during his absence, and he is staying in a place where there are no Jews, he must go to the trouble of illuminating his lodging, because the precept demands that he should *see* the special lights for Chanucah. So great is the duty of illumination, that it is endowed with a Biblical sanction, although it is a post-Biblical institution, and there is a quaint discussion in the Talmud, justifying the wording of the blessing to be recited, viz.: "Blessed art Thou, O Lord our God, King of the Universe, who hast sanctified us by Thy commandments, and commanded us to kindle the light of Chanucah." "Where has God commanded us?" asks the Talmud. Two answers are given. R. Avya says: "The injunction (Deut. xvii. 11) to abide by the decision of the highest religious authorities, applies not only to their interpretation of the Law, but also to the institutions they introduced." R. Nechemya says: "The Torah bids us note the events that befell our race, and treasure them in our memories, for it says, 'Remember the days of old, consider the years of every generation; ask thy father that he may tell thee, and thy elders

that they may declare unto thee' (Deut. xxxii. 7)" [*Sabbath*, 23a; cf. *Jewish Quarterly Review*, iii. 708].

Special precautions have to be taken to show that the Chanucah lights are sacred, that we are not permitted to make profane use of them, but only to look at them, in order that we may be prompted thereby to give thanks to God for His miracles and wonders. Thus, to quote some of the examples given, we may not examine or count money by their light. To avoid confusion with the light for ordinary use, the Chanucah lights must not be placed where the usual light for lighting the room is set. Even the use of the Chanucah lights for sacred purposes was restricted. Thus we may not use the Chanucah light as the light for Habdalah. We are also forbidden to study the Law by the aid of the Chanucah light; but other authorities are more lenient in this respect, and would permit such a habit, because the study of the Law is holy, and we may join holiness to holiness. Hence the "Shammas" (the "attendant" candle by which the other lights are kindled) has been instituted to take its place near the Chanucah lights, so that if by accident we make profane use of them, we may ease our conscience by the pretext that we were enjoying the light of the "Shammas."

During the Middle Ages the illuminations for

Chanucah were placed outside the house to ensure the due "publication of the miracle." The lights were kept at the door or window until half-an-hour after sunset, when the streets ceased resounding with the footfall of men. If the lights were lit after this time of night, there was no compulsion to place them outside the home, because, the street being then empty, there could be no publication of the miracle. Perhaps this half-hour after dark, ultimately fixed as the minimum length of time the Chanucah lights had to be kept burning, was originally the period of grace allowed to laggards to get within the Ghetto gates, which used to be shut from sunset to sunrise.

When the practice of public illumination still obtained, the Chanucah light had by preference to be set on the left-hand side of the door which led to the public thoroughfare, to face the Mezuzah on the right. It is a pretty and subtle touch that the Chanucah light, the symbol commemorating God's help to His people, should shine upon the Mezuzah, typifying Israel's trust in God, and, as it were, justify that profound faith in divine providence. In Egypt, the door on Passover was sprinkled with the blood of the sacrifice. In the Ghetto, the door on Chanucah was bathed in light and hope. If blood were on the door, it could only be the blood of self-sacrifice or martyrdom.

Several circumstances tended to bring about the transference of the illumination from without to within the home. The possible vagaries of the weather may have partly been the cause of such a change. Rain would extinguish the lights, and wind would either put them out or fan the flames of a destructive fire. Then, also, as now, the spirit of mischief in the hearts of passers-by had to be reckoned with. Again, the meaning of public illumination was sometimes open to misconstruction. Thus it is related in the Midrash that once when a son and heir was born to a Roman emperor, the Jews could not take part in the general rejoicing, because the day happened to be the Ninth of Ab. By a strange coincidence this son died on Chanucah, when the Jewish quarter was lit up with the lights of the festival. Owing to these accidental circumstances, many Jews were murdered in cold blood by Roman legions. It is not improbable that some historical truth lurks behind this and similar legends. At all events, in times of danger and persecution, the advisability of having private instead of public illumination was frankly recognised by the authorities, and the alteration was readily sanctioned. And so the performance of the precept of illumination became a domestic rite, and "all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings" (Exod. xii. 23). The deeper the gloom without, the brighter the

light within. In Mr. Stephen Phillips's tragedy Herod is made to exclaim:

> "The brighter still the public brilliance glows,
> The deeper falls this darkness of the hearth."

Jews can reverse the sentiment and assert:

> "The deeper still the public darkness falls,
> The brighter glows this brilliance of the hearth."

Bringing the lights indoors was the beginning of making Chanucah, in all its essential features, a domestic feast. As might have been expected in the celebration of minor feasts in the Jewish calendar, Purim and Chanucah stand in many respects on a similar plane. Purim has its hero, Mordecai the Jew. Chanucah has no mean protagonist in Judas Maccabæus. Purim finds a heroine in Esther. Chanucah claims a heroine in Judith. *Dux femina facti* ("A woman led this enterprise"); hence the wife might be deputed to light the Chanucah lights in her husband's absence. Purim has its scroll of Esther. Chanucah gave rise to the composition of the scroll of Antiochus. Chanucah, like Purim, had its store of riddles, to which Ibn Ezra himself contributed. But the players never suspected that they themselves were the most attractive enigma. The name of Chanucah itself was, by an ingenious division of letters, made to suggest the origin and explanation of the feast, *Chanu Cah*, i.e.

"[the Maccabees] ceased fighting on the twenty-fifth day [of Kislev]," when they proceeded to purify the Temple.

On Chanucah, as on Purim, Jewish parents felt the ecstasy of willing self-surrender to natural domestic affection. Frowns disappeared in looks of glowing content, for in playful tolerance of the children's games there was compensation for cruelty from without. Who would not be moved to tenderness at seeing young eyes open wide and young faces beam with interest at the recital of the picturesque traditions clustering round the careers of the Maccabees? The parental heart responded to all the primal claims made upon it when the Chanucah lights began to flicker, and the excitement of the children grew keener as to whose light would burn the longest. What quivering delight on the last night of the feast, when a bonfire was made of all the remnants of the wicks of the preceding nights, and the Chanucah candles mingled their radiant light with that cast by the lamp in the room and the flames of the fire in the hearth. The Jewish temperament, with its rushes of gaiety cancelling elements of pain, is indeed remarkable. A capacity for joyousness seems to be part of our gifts and heritage. We must be dull of soul indeed not to be touched and charmed by such a picture of merry figures revelling in the practice of religious rites on the Feast of Light. For

here is the true "school for saints," who hand to succeeding generations the torch of faith burning brightly, until the advent of that greater "Feast of Light," which will celebrate the universal reign of truth and peace upon earth.

PURIM POT-POURRI

THERE is a Mazzol ("luck") in the observance of Jewish feasts as there is a Mazzol in the practice of precepts. People make their own choice and form their own attachments, without being able to define with accuracy the motive guiding their selection. Thus, while the celebration of Chanucah is increasing in popularity, the observance of Purim is on the wane. Perhaps Chanucah finds the more favour because it marks the brilliant success which attended a great national effort, whereas Purim only commemorates the happy termination of a local crisis. Affectionate admiration has always been showered upon Mordecai, but hesitation has always been felt in unduly praising the character of Esther. Jews do not like to emphasise Esther's position in an Eastern harem, even though she became Queen, and the rose of Judah surpassed the flower of Persian beauty. There is a faint suspicion, too, that Esther's grace of form does not pardon her want of generosity of mind, for when once her people's safety was assured she still pleaded for an additional day of slaughter of her enemies. Such scruples may be due to Jewish hypersensitive

self-consciousness, and to an exaggerated tendency towards self-apology; for the Jew is often ready to act on the defensive long before there is even a dim notion of attack upon him. Be that as it may, Purim without doubt now fails to attract the Jewish mind as strongly as does Chanucah. It is curious to note, however, that the thirteenth day of Adar, now kept as the Fast of Esther, is associated with the Maccabean struggle for independence, and used to be observed as the Feast of the Day of Nicanor, because on that day the hosts of Nicanor fell before the might of Judas, and Nicanor himself was killed in battle. It would be strange indeed if Purim succeeded in regaining a reflected popularity by reason of this connection with Chanucah.

While Purim itself may have fallen in popular esteem, a tender interest has always been maintained in the method of its former observance. In the Middle Ages Purim developed into the carnival of European Jewry. The reading of the Megillah was listened to with absorbed attention, and the story of Mordecai and Esther, with its stimulus of happiness, had the effect of rousing mediæval Jews from languor. It turned away the keen edge of existing pain. The present faded and the distant past grew clearer. The Jews in the Ghetto acted again the events which had brought a warm stream of gladness into the lives of their ancestors; and for them, too, there beamed the

hope of the ultimate triumph of righteousness over persecution. The strong claims of the children for consideration were not overlooked. The children were allowed to carve small images of Haman, made of wood or stone, upon which they wrote the name of Haman. These they used to strike together, or crush into atoms, when the Chazan pronounced Haman's name; and thus they were supposed literally to fulfil the command, "Thou shalt blot out the remembrance of Amalek" (Deut. xxv. 19). R. Moses Isserles found nothing incongruous in such licence in the synagogue, and quaintly wrote: "The practice should not be scoffed at nor abolished, for not without purpose were such customs instituted." Further to arouse the children's interest certain verses were sung in chorus. The parents felt the force of the custom, and they also repeated the well-worn phrases.

The chants of adult voices and piping childish trebles, the stamping of feet and the beating of "Hamanschlagers" at every reference to the arch-villain of the narrative, combined to produce a happy, confused din. The Chazan ("Reader") was also expected to pay strict attention to certain tricks of reading. Verses describing the sad plight of the Jews when Haman's influence was at its height had to be intoned to the mournful dirge tune of the Lamentations of Jeremiah. Passages narrating the

fall of Haman and the consequent salvation of the Jews, had to be rendered in florid and lively style. But, beyond these natural and perfectly intelligible devices, the Reader was accustomed to lay stress on certain phrases, the initial or final letters of which in Hebrew formed the Tetragrammaton. Similarly, emphasis was laid on the sentence, "Then shall relief and deliverance arise to the Jews from another place" (Esther iv. 14), and on the word "King" in vi. 1, which the Midrash, by bold imagery, referred to God. For not once in the Book of Esther does the name of God occur. It was on this account that a Rabbi doubted the canonicity of the Megillah. But though, in the language of the Rabbi, Esther may not have been written by divine inspiration, the writer was not judged a sceptic. The Jew, in the manner described, infused into the book a divine element, regarded it as instinct with message and sign from God of covenant-keeping, and in the prayer recited after the conclusion of the reading, directly referred Israel's redemption to God's providence. "When Haman, the offshoot of wickedness and arrogance, rose up against us, a flower blossomed forth from the palm-tree of religion—Lo! Hadassah [Esther] appeared to awaken God's remembrance of the covenant he made with them that sleep in the dust."

Hallel was said on Chanucah, but not on Purim, because the Megillah itself was looked upon as a hymn of praise for God's care for his people Israel. The Piyutim introduced into the Amidah in the morning service are the work of Kalir, and they serve as happy examples of his pretty conceit. Kalir observed that there were eighteen words in the Hebrew of Esther ii. 17, which describes the climax of the first part of the story. "And the king loved Esther above all the women, and she obtained grace and favour in his sight more than all the virgins; so that he set the royal crown upon her head, and made her queen instead of Vashti." Kalir also noticed that there were eighteen words in Esther viii. 15, the climax of the second portion of the narrative. "And Mordecai went forth from the presence of the king in royal apparel of blue and white, and with a great crown of gold, and with a robe of fine linen and purple: and the city of Shushan shouted and was glad." There were eighteen benedictions in the Amidah, and the letters forming Kalir's name, together with the traditional ending, *Chazak* ("Be strong"), also numbered eighteen. The materials for Kalir's mosaic composition were thus complete. The first word of the first Piyut to be inserted in the first benediction begins with the first word of Esther ii. 17, and the last phrase of this first Piyut commences

with the first word of Esther viii. 15. A corresponding arrangement is consistently maintained throughout the eighteen Piyutim. The acrostic of eighteen letters forming Kalir's name will be found interwoven, by combining the first letters of the second words in the last phrase of each Piyut.

Purim was no exception to the rule that on Jewish fasts and feasts the poor should not be neglected. On this day there was to be no "scientific" charity, no refusal of alms-giving on the score of the "case" being "undeserving." According to law, every one who held out his hand, was supposed to be *ipso facto* in dire need, and was to receive in no stinted measure.

In addition to being celebrated by charitable distributions to the poor, Purim was further distinguished by the exceptional, and perhaps unique, custom in any religion, of interchange of gifts indicative of sheer friendliness and pure good-fellowship. But various precautions had to be taken in the delivery of such Purim presents. A single man was not to send a friendly gift to a single woman, so that no complicated questions should arise afterwards as to whether such an act should be regarded as constituting a legal marriage. But such a prohibition was not held to apply in the case of charity-giving. It is gratifying to note that non-Jews also benefited by these customs. Gentile servants were given pre-

sents on Purim, and dainties were sent to Gentile neighbours as tokens of goodwill. What a happy, subtle touch, showing an entire absence of rancour against Haman, the individual, as contrasted with Haman, the type of the enemies of Israel!

The Purim meal was perhaps the great event of the day. To mark its nature as a religious act it had to be prefaced by study of the Law. Scriptural authority for this custom was derived from Esther viii. 16, "The Jews had light and gladness," the "light" being interpreted as "the light of the Law." One of the special dishes for the Purim meal consisted of pulse, as a reminder of Daniel's steadfast adherence to the dietary laws in refusing to eat of the king's table. "Then said Daniel to the steward: Prove thy servants, and let them give us pulse to eat and water to drink. So the steward took away their meat, and the wine that they should drink, and gave them pulse" (Dan. i. 12, 16). The connection drawn between Persia and Babylon, and the parallel between the heroism of Mordecai and Daniel, are too obvious to require further comment.

The Talmud states that a man should drink wine on Purim until he can no longer distinguish between "Cursed be Haman" and "Blessed be Mordecai." This seeming encouragement of intemperance was, however, explained in one of two ways. The injunction was regarded as a mathematical joke, arising

from the fact that the numerical value of the two expressions in Hebrew equals 502. Less satisfactory is the second interpretation, that on Purim a man should take a little more wine than usual, so as to induce a post-prandial nap, when, of course, the distinction would be lost in sleep. The table talk at the festive meal was to be of the Law, to secure the Divine Presence at the banquet; for, according to the "Ethics of the Fathers," iii. 3, "If two [or more] sit together and interchange words of Torah, the Divine Presence abides between them." It is not difficult to picture the scene at table, with the wine passing round and the jest circulating fast, the genial raillery, the delicate thrust and the retort courteous, and all bearing banter without bitterness. When study of the Law was the preparation for feasting, when the dinner conversation was of the Law, and when a ritual blessing preceded the taking of wine, the Purim meal could never degenerate into a Bacchanalian revel. It was a true religious rejoicing, with a genuine touch of humanity in the frank enjoyment of good cheer and the unchecked flow of wit.

After dinner came the games, in which old and young joined with equal eagerness. The Jew was at times divinely serious, but behind there always lay the possibility of very earthly laughter. Even the Rabbi loved his joke, and on Purim he would

not condemn a game of cards as beneath his dignity. The student, too, would turn aside on this day from his earnest questioning of the Sages or the diligent search of his own soul for the hidden knowledge of divine secrets, and would willingly take part in the merry-making. In spite of Purim buffooneries, parodies on ritual and Talmud, the Jew did not laugh at, but laughed with, and rejoiced in his religion. His faith was so deep that he could play at unfaith. His religiousness was so genuine that he could act irreligion. But just as Hamlet's feigned madness has deceived many commentators into the belief that Hamlet was mad in reality, so incompetent critics have mistaken the pretended levity of Jews on Purim as proofs of rank irreverence. But the Jewish mind was so well disciplined that it could slip from the devout to the burlesque without necessarily overstepping the bounds of decorum.

Purim was one of those days on which the Jew could unbend and summon, as with a wizard's wand, the answering love of his wife, the eloquence in her eyes, and the sweet, responsive delight in the heart of his children. As the Jew looked on his family circle, with a gleam of tenderness forcing its way through the more usual sternness of his words and mien, childish impulsiveness became unrestrained and made sunlight in the shadows of the Ghetto. The sense that the beauty and hope of life still lay

about him stole soothingly upon the soul of the Jew, and the bright nature of the East blossomed forth even in the Diaspora. In its human interest the Ghetto could vie with the palace rising in the distance; for in the Ghetto, too, life currents ebbed and flowed in hearts pulsating to great needs, great sorrows, and great loves. And as we linger over such scenes of innocent, picturesque merriment in the practice of religious rites, as we see those images of willing anguish for a living faith, as we observe those upturned faces and lips moving to old prayers, Purim cannot lose its value for us. The narrative of Esther and Mordecai may fail to attract us as history, but as a type of Israel's destiny, it must strengthen our belief in God's care for His people, and ever shine out for the warning and guidance of men.

Jewis
and
Adler House,

Printed by BALLANTYNE, HANSON & Co.
Edinburgh & London

JEWS' COLLEGE
LIBRARY
LONDON